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I.

INTRODUCTION

Until recently unlocked by new drilling technology, vast potential
wealth was secreted thousands of feet underground in ancient shale
strata-an energy source unrecognized by the world at the dawn of the
Twenty First Century. The discovery of enormous shale gas reservoirs in
the United States has triggered what some have termed a "gas rush"likened to the great Gold "rush" of the latter half of the nineteenth
century in the American West.' A PhiladelphiaInquirer article titled
Pa.'s Natural Gas Rush reported in early 2011:
Natural gas companies have been drilling in Pennsylvania for more
than a century, but Marcellus Shale exploration is unlike anything
As Marcellus Shale operators move into full-scale
before....
production, several trends are emerging that underscore the huge
transformation under way in Pennsylvania. ... The bigger wells
require larger amounts of water, steel-and money. Operators say
they are spending $4 million to $6 million per well. The drilling is
producing greater environmental anxiety, measured by a growing
opposition to hydraulic fracturing, the method used to extract gas
from shale.

But investors are still bullish. . . . "The Marcellus is

going to be far more prolific than we ever imagined," said . .. [the]
managing director of. . . an investment company. "It's almost scary
how good the Marcellus is. It's supereconomic.

Judge Charles H. Haden II Professor of Law, West Virginia University College
of Law. The author acknowledges the research support of the Arthur B. Hodges Faculty
Research Fund and the excellent research assistance of Vanessa A. Baxter, J.D., West
Virginia University (2012). Errors are the author's.
1. Andrew Maykuth, Pa.'s Natural Gas Rush, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 3,
2011, available at http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20110403_PasNatural_
GasRush.html?viewAll-y&c=y\. The article documents enormous investment by the
top twenty drilling companies. The article reports that just seven of these companies plan
to spend more than $6.5 billion drilling new Marcellus wells in Pennsylvania during
calendar year 2011.
2. Id. See also TIMOTHY CONSIDINE, ROBERT WATSON, REBECCA ENTLER &
JEFFREY SPARKS, AN EMERGING GIANT: PROSPECTS & EcoNoMIC IMPACTS OF DEVELOPING
THE MARCELLUS SHALE NATURAL GAS PLAY (Penn. St. Univ. 2009), available at
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Pennsylvania is not alone in experiencing a nascent natural shale
gas boom.3 Shale gas "plays" underlie wide swaths of surface lands
stretching west and south from New York and Pennsylvania in the East
to Texas, Louisiana, and New Mexico in the Southwest and to parts of
the Intermountain West.4 Those shales carry names like Marcellus, New
Albany, Barnett, Haynesville, Mancos, Hermosa, Lewis Mowry, and
Eagle Ford-arcane names found in geology texts and until recently
mentioned, if at all, only in graduate school petroleum geology lectures.s
With so much at stake as the new shale gas industry takes wing, it is
not surprising that a plethora of attendant legal issues have begun to
surface. Many legal issues related to Marcellus and other gas-rich shale
plays must be confronted and resolved if this new energy source is to be
responsibly exploited. Scholars and bar commentators have already
begun to address a variety of legal concerns attendant shale gas
exploration and development. 6 These issues will be addressed in detail
http://www.alleghenyconference.org/PDFs/PELMisc/PSUStudyMarcellusShale072409.p
df.
3. The heart of the Marcellus shale gas boom is located in Pennsylvania where, in
1859, the world's first oil boom began with a successful well drilled at Titusville,
Crawford County. See Thomas A. Mitchell, The Future of Oil and Gas Conservation
Jurisprudence:Past as Prologue, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 380-94 (2010). Other states
are beginning to experience the Marcellus shale gas boom. See Hannah J. Wiseman,
Regulatory Adaptation in FracturedAppalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 240-41
(2010) [hereinafter FracturedAppalachia].
4. A shale or resource "play" is a term associated with oil and gas exploration and
development.
A "play" has been defined as "an area in which hydrocarbon
accumulations or prospects of a given type occur" and as a "conceptual model for a style
of hydrocarbon accumulation used by explorationists to develop prospects in a basin,
region or trend and used by development personnel to continue exploiting a given trend."
SCHLUMBERGER OILFIELD GLOSSARY, available at http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/

Display.cfn?Term=play. "A play (or a group of interrelated plays) generally occurs in a
single petroleum system." Id
5.

See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY NAT'L ENERGY TECH. LAB.,

MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 56 (2009),

available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/epreports/shale
gasprimer_2009.pdf. Among the major shale plays identified are the vast Marcellus
shales of the Appalachian Basin; the New Albany shale in the Illinois basin; the Barnett
shale in the Fort Worth Basin; the Haynesville shale in Louisiana; the Mancos, Hermosa,
Lewis, and Mowry shales in the Inter-Mountain West; the Eagle Ford shale in South
Texas; and the Gammon in the Williston Basin. For a map of these basins showing the
states involved, see http://www.eia.gov/oilgas/rpd/shalegas.pdf. Shale gas is also
found in many countries and continents.
AMERICA:

EMERGING

See Kevin Heffernan, SHALE GAS IN NORTH

SUPPLY OPPORTUNITIES,

NORTHEAST

ENERGY

AND COMMERCE

ASSOCIATION FUELS CONFERENCE (September 24, 2008), http://www.necanews.org/dev/

documents/080924heffemankevin_ .pdf.
6. See, e.g., Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface "Trespass": A Man's Subsurface is
Not His Castle, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 248 (2010); Robert E. Beck, Current Water Issues in
Oil and Gas Development and Production: Will Water Control What Energy We Have?,
49 WASHBURN L.J. 423 (2010); Laura H. Burney, The Texas Supreme Court and Oil and
Gas Jurisprudence: What Hath Wagner & Brown v. Sheppard Wrought?, 5 TEX. J. OIL
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by the bench, bar, and legal scholars as the shale gas boom matures.
Billions of dollars of investment and the future of shale play
communities and their natural environment hang in the balance.
The goal of this essay is quite modest-to stimulate discussion of
the extent to which constitutional regulatory takings rules may operate as
a constraint on development of, or as a license to exploit, gas-bearing
shales. Public policy debate over impacts of shale gas extraction has
included consideration of citizen demands for federal, state, and
to
minimize
intervention
regulatory
government
municipal
environmental and related harms. In this context, regulatory takings
issues related to shale gas extraction are ripe for discussion.
I begin by briefly discussing the nature of shale gas and the new
technology involved in releasing huge quantities of natural gas from eons
of imprisonment far below the earth's surface. The discussion then
moves to a review of basic tenets of the constitutional protection of
private property afforded by the takings jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court of the United States. Also examined are the leading cases from
which the contours of regulatory takings analysis have evolved. In
GAS & ENERGY L. 219 (2010); David A. Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the
Antifragmentation Principle in State Property Law, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (2010)
(discussing statutory unitization of underground oil and gas fields); Wes Deweese,
Fracturing Misconceptions: A History of Effective State Regulation, Groundwater
Protection, and the Ill-Conceived FRAC Act, 6 OKLA. J. L. & TECH. 49 (2010); Harper
Estes & Douglas Prieto, Contractsas Fences: Representing the Agricultural Producerin
an Oil and Gas Environment, 73 TEX. B.J. 378 (2010); Keith B. Hall, The Continuing
Role of Implied Covenants in Developing Leased Lands, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 313 (2010);
Bill Jeffery, Oops!-Accidents Happen: Oil Pollution Prevention at Onshore Production
Facilities, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 493 (2010); Kendor P. Jones, Something Old, Something
New: The Evolving Farmout Agreement, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 477 (2010); Bruce M.
Kramer, Keeping Leases Alive in the Era of Horizontal Drilling and Hydraulic
Fracturing: Are the Old Workhorses (Shut-in, Continuous Operations, and Pooling
Provisions) Up to the Task?, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 283 (2010); John S. Lowe, The Future of
Oil and Gas Law, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 235 (2010); Mitchell, supra note 3; Phillip E.
Norvell, Prelude to the Future of Shale Gas Development: Well Spacing and Integration
for the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 457 (2010); Bruce M. Pendery,
BLM's Retained Rights: How Requiring Environmental Protection Fulfills Oil and Gas
Lease Obligations, 40 ENVTL. L. REV. 599 (2010); David E. Pierce, Royalty
Jurisprudence:A Tale of Two States, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 347 (2010); Kermit L. Rader,
Protecting Clientsfrom Going Bust in the Gas Boom, 32 PENNSYLVANIA LAW. 30 (2010);

Laura C. Reeder, Note, Creating a Legal Frameworkfor Regulation of Natural Gas
Extractionfrom the Marcellus Shale Formation, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 999 (2010); FracturedAppalachia,supra note 3; Travis Zeik, Hydraulic Fracturing
Goes to Court: How Texas Jurisprudence on Subsurface Trespass Will Influence West
Virginia Oil and Gas Law, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 599 (2010).
7. "Gas Patch" is a colloquial term frequently used to describe those geographical
areas where there is significant oil and/or natural gas production. An example of the use
of the term in connection with shale gas operations may be found in SANDRA
RAISING ELIJAH: PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN
STEINGRABER,
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, 276 (2011) [hereinafter RAISING ELIJAH].

IN
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Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the Supreme Court's seminal 1922
regulatory takings case, Justice Holmes cautioned:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law. As long recognized some values are
enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits or
the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for
consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the
diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation
to sustain the act.8
While many scholars and the Court itself have found Holmes's
explanation of the line between valid regulation and unconstitutional
taking of private property to be cryptic, subsequent cases have provided
significant guidance that allow crafting of regulatory efforts so as to
avoid constitutional infirmity.9
Applying extant regulatory taking analysis to government regulation
of shale gas operations, the essay identifies regulatory takings issues that
will likely receive close scrutiny as regulatory efforts advance in the
shale gas patch. Probable contexts of takings challenges to federal, state,
and municipal regulatory action are examined, and the possible
constitutional limits on the reach of such regulation of shale gas drilling
and production activities are analyzed.
Ultimately I suggest that constitutional takings principles can, in
limited circumstances and at the margins, limit shale gas regulation.
However, in most cases, I conclude that carefully sculpted regulatory
initiatives will create regulatory regimes largely impervious to
constitutional takings challenges. As explained below, most shale gas
regulatory efforts intended to protect the environment and related
important interests generally will be sustained as permissible exercises of
the police power. However, such a result will require legislators and
regulators to recognize and observe well-established regulatory takings
parameters.
8. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
9. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-38 (2005) wherein Justice
O'Connor observed:
Beginning with Mahon . . . the Court recognized that government regulation of
private property may, in some instances, be so onerous that its effect is
tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster-and that such "regulatory
takings" may be compensable under the Fifth Amendment. In Justice Holmes'
storied but cryptic formulation, "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The rub, of
course, has been-and remains-how to discern how far is "too far."
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TAPPING ANEW ENERGY SOURCE: SHALE GAS

Shale gas production differs substantially from conventional vertical
rotary drilling natural gas extraction methods that have been used to
0
produce natural gas from other geologic strata for more than a century.'
Brilliant technological innovation of petroleum engineers introduced
horizontal drilling" and high volume hydraulic fracturing ("HVHF")
techniques that led to unlocking huge reserves of natural gas in deep
shale zones .12 When used in conjunction with horizontal drilling, HVHF
allows extraction of shale gas at reasonable cost commensurate with
production expenditures. These combined techniques stimulate natural
gas to flow rapidly to the well; commercial quantities of gas cannot be
3
produced from shale using the conventional vertical drilling method.
Initial success using horizontal drilling and HVHF methods in the
Barnett Shale Basin of North Central Texas first confirmed the economic
viability of large scale shale gas operations, paving the way for
exploration and production from shale strata in other North American
10. Energy in Brief, United States Energy Information Agency (2011) [hereinafter
Energy in Briefj, available at http://www.eia.gov/energyin brief/about shalegas.cfm.
For almost a century and a half, natural gas has been extracted from gas reservoirs
created by the migration of gas toward the surface. Over geologic time, the gas flowed
upwards from lower organic-rich source strata into highly permeable reservoir rock.
There, its migration was blocked by a layer of overlying impermeable rock. Id. In
contrast, shale gas is found within the organic-rich shale source strata. The shale's low
permeability greatly inhibits gas from migrating upward to more permeable reservoir
rocks. Horizontal drilling combined with hydraulic fracturing allows shale gas
extraction. Shale gas production would not be economically feasible without use of these
techniques because the gas would not achieve flow rates high enough to justify the cost
of drilling. Id. See also FracturedAppalachia, supra note 3, at 236-39. For an excellent
summary of horizontal drilling and fracing techniques used in the extraction of shale gas,
see RICHARD C. MAXWELL, PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, OIL AND GAS:
CASES AND MATERIALS, 1-11 (8th ed. 2007) (explaining conventional vertical rotary
drilling methodology used for extracting natural gas from porous strata).
11. Horizontal drilling provides greater access to the gas located deep in the
producing formation than does conventional vertical natural gas drilling. A vertical well
is first drilled to a targeted geologic formation. At a predetermined depth, the drill bit is
remotely turned to horizontally drill a hole that extends hundreds of feet horizontally
through the shale layer, exposing the well to much more of the producing shale than
would a solely vertical well. Energy in Brief, supra note 10. A readily understandable,
simplified diagram of the shale gas extraction process is available at
http://www.propublica.org/special/hydraulic-fracturing-national.
12. See Reeder, supra note 6, at 1003-05. See also Fueling North America's Energy
Future, The Unconventional Natural Gas Revolution and the Carbon Agenda, IHS
Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Executive Summary, ES-4, available at
North
Fueling
[hereinafter
http://www2.cera.com/docs/ExecutiveSummary.pdf
America's Energy Future] (last visited, March 12, 2011) ("These innovations have
unlocked the potential of natural gas shales that have greatly increased the potential
supply of natural gas in North America and at a much lower cost than conventional
natural gas.").
13. Energy in Brief, supra note 10.
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basins.14 The understanding of the scope of the gas shale resource in the
United States increased dramatically in an extraordinarily short period of
time. The United States Energy Information Administration ("USEIA")
reported a one year increase in expert assessment of the amount of
technically recoverable (although unproved) shale gas from 347 trillion
cubic feet to 827 trillion cubic feet (as of January 1, 2009), "reflecting
additional information that has become available with more drilling
activity in new and existing shale plays."' 5
The USEIA indicates that this increased reserve will lead to a
doubling of shale gas production and more than a twenty percent higher
total output of natural gas in the lower forty eight states by 2035.16 The
agency predicts attendant lower natural gas prices as a result.' 7 Analysts
report that the newly discovered shale gas resource potential significantly
increases North American recoverable gas reserves to an amount
sufficient to meet current levels of consumption for more than a hundred
years.18
The possible scale of the resource was not recognized until late
2007, and discussions of its import in the world's energy future did not
appear until the latter part of 2009.19 A recent report of an influential
think-tank observed:
A major new factor-unconventional natural gas-is moving to the
fore in the . . . national energy discussion..

..

[I]t ranks as the most

significant energy innovation so far this century-and one that,
because of its scale, requires a reassessment of expectations for
energy development. It has the potential, at least, to cause a
paradigm shift in the fueling of North America's energy future.20
Expert energy commentator and Pulitzer Prize-winning author
Daniel Yergin has observed that the unconventional gas "has the
potential to boost gas production far beyond North America ... [it] can
have far-reaching impact on the electric power industry and the fuel
choices in the years ahead." 21 These projections, however, are tempered
14. See, e.g., FracturedAppalachia,supra note 3, at 233-34.
15. AEO Annual Energy Outlook, 2011 Early Release Overview, at 1, availableat
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383er(2011).pdf
[hereinafter Annual Energy
Outlook 2011].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Natural Gas Enters New Era of Abundance, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 10,
2011,
available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-03/10/c_
13769546.htm [hereinafter New Era].
19. Fueling North America's Energy Future, supra note 12, at ES-1.
20. Id.
21. New Era, supra note 18. See generally DANIEL YERGIN, TIE PRIZE: THE Epic
QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER (2009).
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by USEIA warnings that a variety of factors may affect actual
22
outcomes. Notwithstanding such extraordinary positive predictions 23of
the future of shale gas, there are skeptics who challenge such forecasts.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY-TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE LIMITS ON GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF SHALE
GAS DRILLING AND PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES

Significant controversy has accompanied the accelerating pace of
shale gas drilling across the American shale gas patch. Recent media
attention and public discourse has focused on the proper role of
government in protecting the environment and related important public
interests. In New York State, for example, a temporary moratorium on
shale play development triggered by state statutory environmental
assessment requirements has been applauded by some and condemned by
Gas industry interests as well as environmental and
others.24
conservation advocates have demanded legislative action-albeit in
differing forms and for different reasons. The former lobby for laws and
22. See Annual Energy Outlook 2011, supra note 15, at 8. The USEIA cautioned
that:
[T]here is considerable uncertainty about the amounts of recoverable shale gas
Well characteristics and
in both developed and undeveloped areas.
productivity vary widely not only across different plays but within individual
plays. Initial production rates can vary by as much as a factor of 10 across a
formation, and the productivity of adjacent gas wells can vary by as much as a
factor of 2 or 3. Many shale formations, such as the Marcellus Shale, are so
large that only a small portion of the entire formation has been intensively
production-tested.

Environmental

considerations

. . . lend

additional

uncertainty.
23. See Ian Urbana, DrillingDown: Insiders Sound an Alarm Amid a Natural Gas
Rush, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 25, 2011 [hereinafter Insiders Sound Alarm], available at
The New York
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/us/26gas.html?pagewanted=all.
Times reported that:
[T]he gas may not be as easy and cheap to extract from shale formations deep
underground as the companies are saying, according to hundreds of industry emails and internal documents and an analysis of data from thousands of wells.
In the e-mails, energy executives, industry lawyers, state geologists and market
analysts voice skepticism about lofty forecasts and question whether companies
are intentionally, and even illegally, overstating the productivity of their wells
and the size of their reserves. Many of these e-mails also suggest a view that is
in stark contrast to more bullish public comments made by the industry, in
much the same way that insiders have raised doubts about previous financial
bubbles.
But see Ken Boehm, NY Times Asked to Investigate Shale Gas 'Bubble' Series, National
Legal & Policy Center Blog, available at http://nlpc.org/stories/2011/07/07/ny-timesasked-investigate-shale-gas-bubble-series.
24. Exec. Order No. 41, issued December 13, 2010 (Requiring Further
Environmental Review of High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing in the Marcellus Shale),
availableat http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.html#41
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regulations that will facilitate exploitation of the economic potential of
shale gas; the latter advocate for enhanced regulation and enforcement
power to protect the environment and related public interests.
Regulatory takings claims have already begun to surface in
Pennsylvania and West Virginia courts. Legislative and regulatory
restrictions on natural gas drilling within government-owned parklands
and a municipal ban on HVHF near a city drinking water source have
been challenged. 25 Not surprisingly, in the wake of more than two
decades of private property rights activism in the United States, 26 the
dramatic increase of shale gas development activities has triggered widespread concern among homeowners and communities throughout the
Marcellus Shale gas basin over the impacts of gas extraction and the
value of gas drilling rights. Litigation will likely ensue in the not-toodistant future in a variety of contexts challenging state and federal efforts
to regulate gas shale drilling and related activities. The extent to which
constitutional takings doctrine may limit state and federal government
efforts to regulate shale gas development is discussed below.
A.

Eminent Domain and Inverse Condemnation

At the heart of constitutional takings jurisprudence is the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition of government "taking" of private property for
a public use unless just compensation is paid to the affected property
owner.27 Unconstitutional takings of private property by government
25. See Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Huffinan 705 S.E.2d 806 (W. Va. 2010); Belden
& Blake Corp. v. Dept. of Conservation & Natural Res., 969 A.2d 528 (Pa. 2009). See
also Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., Nos. 10-1265 and 10-2332, slip op. at 2728 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 2011) (holding federal agency lacks power under statute to impose
additional regulations on gas drilling operation in National Forest, thus avoiding
regulatory taking issue).
26. With regard to growing concerns over the rights of property and the private
property "movement" in the United States, see generally JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF
PROPERTY: TOWARD AN EGALITARIAN THEORY OF OWNERSHIP (1994); WHO OwNs
AMERICA? SOCIAL CONFLICT OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS (Harvey M. Jacobs ed., 1998);
CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994); LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE: WISE USE AND THE PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (John Echeverria & Raymond Booth Eby eds., 1995);
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF
OWNERSHIP (2000); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property:
Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 281 (2002); LAURA S.
UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER (2003); Eric T.
Freyfogel, Propertyand Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (2010).
27. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides in relevant part: "No person
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The Fifth Amendment protects rights of citizens from federal government
action; ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment extended the protection afforded by the
Takings Clause to state action. The Takings Clause was first applied to the states through
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action may occur directly by exercise of the power of eminent domain to
condemn private land. A taking may also occur when government
regulatory action effectively devalues land without first undertaking
formal condemnation proceedings.
A government entity may physically "take" private real property by
initiation of formal condemnation proceedings in administrative or
judicial fora. At the conclusion of the condemnation process and
payment of just compensation, private real property owner's interests are
extinguished, and legal title to the real estate is transferred to the
government or a related entity. Property may also be "taken" by soInverse condemnation is
called "inverse condemnation." 28
distinguishable from a taking by eminent domain in so far as the latter is
"a shorthand description of the legal action taken by a landowner to
recover just compensation for a taking of his property when the
29
Government did not initiate condemnation proceedings."
B.

Regulatory Takings

Regulatory takings of private property are quite different from
takings resulting from a government decision to take land by
condemnation or inverse condemnation. A regulatory taking may occur
as a result of the application or enforcement of a law or regulation
enacted to advance or protect the public interest; when the directive has
the effect of reducing or destroying the economic value of real property,
an owner of the property affected may seek to invalidate it by claiming a
regulatory taking. The concept of regulatory taking was not recognized
until the beginning of the Twentieth Century when the Supreme Court of
the Fourteenth Amendment in Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 239 (1897). The Takings Clause was the first Bill of Rights provision to be found
applicable to the states. Id. at 239. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 640 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the Takings Clause and its
purpose).
28. See, e.g., Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
29. In Jacobs v. United States, a Government dam created intermittent overflows of
water onto private land resulting in the "taking" of a servitude. Jacobs, the landowner,
filed suit against the Government to recover just compensation for the "taking" of his
property. Commenting on the nature of the landowner's claim, the Court stated:
The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for property
taken by the United States for public use in the exercise of its power of eminent
domain. That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that
condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the right was asserted in
suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the claim. The form
of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amendment.
Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary.
Such a promise was implied because of the duty to pay imposed by the
Amendment."
Id. at 16.
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the United States declared unconstitutional a state law that sought to
limit adverse impacts of coal mining.30
The property interest involved in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
was an interest in coal that had been severed from a fee simple interest in
land.3 ' The coal company claimant alleged that the state statute
prohibiting mining under buildings to prevent subsidence damage
effected an unconstitutional taking of its property.32 Thus, in Mahon, the
Court dealt directly with the issue of severed mineral interests alleged to
have been destroyed by operation of the 1921 Pennsylvania coal mine
subsidence law.33
Mahon emphasized that "the question depends upon the particular
facts" and "this is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be
disposed of by general propositions." 3 4 Nevertheless, the Court held the
law prohibiting mining under occupied dwellings "took" the company's
property-property that included only a reserved coal seam and attendant
mining rights. The 1921 Pennsylvania statute (the "Kohler Act") made
"it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal" and thus had "very
nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or

30. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Some commentators have
questioned the assertion that Mahon was a case involving the just compensation clause,
arguing that the opinion was actually grounded in a version of the later discredited
substantive due process doctrine of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and its
progeny. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'
Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 668 (1996) (discussing Justice Holmes's
unquestionable acceptance of "a version of the fundamental rights theory of the Due
Process Clause"); Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory "Takings": The Remarkable
Resurrection of Economic Substantive Due Process Analysis in ConstitutionalLaw, 17
ENVTL. L. REPTR. 10369 (1987).

31. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412.
32. Id. In a 1988 case involving a state law regulating coal mining subsidence, the
Supreme Court explained the impact of unregulated, underground, coal mining induced
subsidence:
Coal mine subsidence is the lowering of strata overlying a coal mine, including
the land surface, caused by the extraction of underground coal. This lowering
of the strata can have devastating effects. It often causes substantial damage to
foundations, walls, other structural members, and the integrity of houses and
buildings. Subsidence frequently causes sinkholes or troughs in land which
make the land difficult or impossible to develop. Its effect on farming has been
well documented-many subsided areas cannot be plowed or properly prepared.
Subsidence can also cause the loss of groundwater and surface ponds. In short,
it presents the type of environmental concern that has been the focus of so
much federal, state, and local regulation in recent decades.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1987).
33. Id. at 412.
34.

Id. at 413, 416.
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destroying it.""3 In the parlance of today's takings cases, 36the owner's
entire interest, or bundle of rights, in the coal had been taken.
As noted above, Justice Holmes's opinion for the Mahon Court
cryptically observed that "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
Holmes elaborated vaguely on the point of "going too far":
As long recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due
process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining
such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question
depends upon the particular facts. The greatest weight is given to the
judgment of the legislature but it always is open to interested parties
to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional
38
power.
Since the Mahon decision, the Court's "regulatory takings"
jurisprudence has evolved in a series of cases decided over the next nine
decades. In nearly a century of the evolution of regulatory takings
jurisprudence since Mahon, courts have made ad hoc, case by case,
adjudications identifying in each instance whether a particular law or
regulation falls on the side of a valid police power exercise or has gone
"to far" and violates the constitutional takings prohibition.
Distinguishing between appropriate police power regulation that
advances important public interests and government regulation that goes
too far resulting in unconstitutional takings often requires courts to make
difficult choices. A quarter of a century ago Professor Richard Epstein
aptly described this dilemma:
The two sides of the debate are well marked. On the one hand,
private property has often been praised as the bulwark of individual
liberty, to be held sacred and inviolate against any and all intrusions.
On this view, its protection becomes, as it was for Locke, the raison

35. Id. at 414.
36. The Court reasoned that because the law extinguished all economic value of the
company's coal and mining rights, "private persons or communities" bore "the risk of
acquiring only surface rights." "[T]he fact that their risk ha[d] become a danger [did not]
warrant the giving to them [of] greater rights than they bought." Id. at 414-16.
37. Id. at 415. Over time, the term "regulatory" taking became synonymous with
government regulatory actions that go "too far" and will be considered an
unconstitutional taking of private property unless accompanied by payment of just
compensation.
38. Id. at 413.
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d'8tre for the state. On the other hand, private property has been
attacked as the mark of social privilege-indeed theft-that allows
the lucky few to dominate the unfortunate many. It becomes the
social institution that mark's mankind's fall from grace. Neither of
these extreme positions can be maintained. But quickly ruling out the
extremes, there remains open the difficult and vexing task of marking
the intermediate path.39
In the years since Professor Epstein's' observation, the vexing task of
deciding when regulation goes "too far" remains elusive,
notwithstanding multiple judicial efforts to bring clarity to regulatory
takings jurisprudence.
Despite this continuing constitutional conundrum, it is possible to
extract from the cases basic principles that will guide courts in resolving
potential regulatory takings challenges to government efforts to regulate
shale gas development activities. Even as the outer edge of regulatory
takings law continues to intrigue scholars and bedevil lawyers and
judges, the results of some potential constitutional challenges to shale
play regulation are predictable upon careful analysis of regulatory
takings precedent.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp., the Court held
that when a government entity enters land and occupies it or permits
others to do so under color of law, a per se takings rule is to be applied
by the Court requiring that the owner of the occupied land be paid "just
compensation.'4o

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council established a second
categorical rule ("total taking rule") applicable to those "relatively rare"
and "extraordinary" government regulations that deprive an owner of
"all economically beneficial use" of one's property.4 1 In Lucas, the
Court held that the government must compensate for "total regulatory
takings," except to the extent that "background principles of nuisance
and property law" independently restrict the owner's intended use of the
property.42

39. Richard Epstein, Takings: Decent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 1
(1987). For a more lengthy presentation of Professor Epstein's sometimes controversial
takings perspective, see EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
40. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982)
(holding a state law requiring landlords to permit cable companies to install cable
facilities in apartment buildings amounted to a taking).
41. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). See John D.
Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 171, 173
(2005) ("[T]he Court has given the Loretto per se rule a narrow interpretation [and] ...
the Lucas per se rule an even narrower reading....
42. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-32.
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Outside of these two relatively narrow per se takings categories, the
Court has said that "regulatory takings challenges are governed by the
standards set forth in Penn Central [Transp. Co. v. New York City]."43
"The Penn Centralfactors . .. have served as the principal guidelines for
resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical
takings or Lucas rules."4
The Penn Central Court admitted that, since Mahon, it had not been
able "to develop any 'set formula' for determining regulatory takings
claims. But, Penn Central did identify several significant factors to be
considered from its earlier cases stretching back to Mahon: "[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investmentand the "'character of the governmental
backed expectations,"45
it amounts to a physical invasion or
whether
instance
action'-for
instead merely affects property interests through 'some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good'-may be relevant in discerning whether a taking has
occurred.""
The following discussion examines potential regulatory takings
challenges to shale gas regulation. The per se categorical takings
principles discussed above will be reviewed and then applied to
foreseeable government regulatory action involving shale gas
development. The more generally applicable Penn Central taking rules
will then be appraised and their potential application to shale gas
regulation discussed.
IV. CONTOURS OF REGULATORY TAKINGS ANALYSIS

The Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence focuses on the impact
of the government's action on the private property interests allegedly
"taken" by government action. As mentioned above, the Court has
developed two threshold per se taking rules applicable to the analysis of
regulatory takings claims.

43.
Transp.
44.
45.
46.

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (citing Penn Cent.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
Id. at 539 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001)).
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
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CategoricalPer Se Takings Rules
1.

Regulatory Taking by Physical Occupation

The firstper se takings rule is simple to apply. The takings plaintiff
has the burden of showing that the government's action involves physical
occupation of private real property.4 7 Such physical occupation may
involve government assertion of complete dominion and control of the
property or over only a portion of the property.4 8
Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. is the leading modern case
articulating this per se rule.
Loretto involved a New York statute requiring landlords to permit
cable television companies to install equipment in and on rental property.
The law allowed a State Commission to decide appropriate compensation
for the intrusion of cable lines into privately owned residential rental
property. The fee was set by the Commission at one dollar-an amount
found by the Commission to be reasonable under the statute. Upon
purchasing a five-story apartment building in New York City, a landlord
found that a cable television company had installed cables in the building
to serve tenants living there. The landlord brought a class action suit in a
New York state court seeking damages and injunctive relief, alleging that
the statute constituted a taking without just compensation.
The Supreme Court ultimately agreed that the statute affected an
unconstitutional taking. 49 The Court did not question the government's
assertion that the cable television law fell within the State's police power
as the statute clearly served legitimate public purposes of enhancing
communications that have "important educational and community
aspects."5
However, the Court emphasized, "[i]t is a separate
question .. . whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property
rights that compensation must be paid."5 1 The Court concluded "that a
permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking
47. Personal property has also been the subject of takings analysis, but the Supreme
Court has extended scant protection to it. See Lucas v S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1027-28 (1992). In Lucas, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court emphasized that
owners of "personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally high degree of control
over commercial dealings . . . ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation
might even render his property economically worthless (at least if the property's only
economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale)." Id. (citing Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979)).
48. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 425 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d
320, 329 (N.Y. 1981)).
51. Id. at 425-26 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
127-28 (1978)); Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 193 (1928).

2011]

REGULATORY TAKINGS INTHE SHALE GAS PATCH

207

without regard to the public interests that it may serve. 52 Historically,
the Court observed, "[w]hen faced with a constitutional challenge to a
permanent physical occupation of real property" it has "invariably found
a taking."5 3
A closely related corollary to this "permanent physical occupation
doctrine" is that government acquisitions of resources to permit or
facilitate uniquely public functions have been held to be unconstitutional
takings.5 4 For example, in two early, pre-Mahon cases, the Court held
that in both situations-repeated firing of guns over the taking claimant's
land from a federal military base and intermittent flooding of land caused
by a water project-the government action affected a taking.55 Later, in
United States v. Causby, direct airplane over-flights above a claimant's
land were found so noisy and intrusive that they destroyed the use of the
land as a chicken farm. The Court held this to be a taking, observing that
the government was effectively "using" part of the property as a flight
path for its planes.5 6 Similarly, in Griggs v. Allegheny County, the Court
held that commercial airplane over-flights on landing and takeoff paths
from a municipal airport required "use" of a claimant's property and
therefore constituted a taking requiring compensation. 7
While there have been few cases delineating the parameters of per
se takings involving physical occupation of property by the government,
the categorical rule is not difficult to apply. Loretto makes clear that any
appreciable entry into private property that constitutes a "use" of that
property is compensable, unless it is de minimis. While the court has not
articulated a de minimis rule, common sense suggests that some
incursions of government activity into private property would not
constitute a taking, including, for example, the wafting of the smell of
baking apple pies from a military base bakery, one airplane over-flight
per month above a tract of private land, or many over-flights at an
elevation that renders the noise barely perceptible. Such narrow
exceptions notwithstanding, the Loretto per se rule requiring
52. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
53. Id. at 428 (citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1872)) (holding that
defendant's construction, pursuant to state authority, of a dam which permanently flooded
plaintiffs property constituted a taking). In Pumpelly, "real estate [was] actually invaded
by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any
artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness. . . .
Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181. The Loretto Court noted the distinction between physical
occupation and mere restriction of the use of private property by regulation. Loretto, 458
U.S. at 427-28 (citing N. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879)).
54. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104.
55. Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); United States v. Cress,
243 U.S. 316 (1917).
56. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262-63 (1946).
57. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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compensation for government physical takings is strict; more than de
minimis physical invasions of private property will fall within its
purview.
2.

Per Se Physical Occupation Rule and Shale Gas Regulation

It is difficult to foresee many circumstances when government
regulation of shale gas development would trigger invocation of
Lorretto'sper se takings rule. The actual capture and use of shale gas by
the government as a result of horizontal drilling and HVHF could fall in
this category if the horizontal well bore or the fracing fluid entered into a
subterranean area owned by a private party-and actually extracted the
shale gas located there. Of course, if the common law "rule of capture"
were to apply to shale gas extraction, the government might successfully
claim a right to shale gas produced by horizontal drilling into and fracing
of shale strata beneath lands adjoining its own.58 Such an argument is
problematic, but beyond the scope of this essay.59
58. The rule of capture has been explained and defined by a distinguished
commentator:
The rule of capture states that a landowner in a common source of oil and gas
supply is legally privileged to take oil and gas from his or her land, even though
in so doing he or she may take some of the oil or gas from adjoining lands.
When the "rule of capture" applies, the landowner incurs no liability for
causing oil or gas to migrate across property boundaries and is not required to
compensate adjoining landowners for draining oil and gas from their lands.
The only protection that an owner has against loss of oil and gas to neighboring
owners because of migration is the right to drill offset wells that would
interrupt the flow of oil and gas being drawn to the neighboring wells. The rule
of capture has been modified by the doctrine of correlative rights and by
conservation legislation designed to protect the interest of the public. Although
a mineral owner has a right to its fair share of the minerals on and under its
property, this right does not extend to specific oil and gas beneath the property.
The minerals owner is entitled, not to the molecules actually residing below the
surface, but to a fair chance to recover the oil and gas in or under his land, or
their equivalents in kind.
1 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 3:7 (3d ed. 2010) (citations omitted).
59. See Anderson, supra note 6 ("I conclude that courts should not allow subsurface
trespass claims unless the plaintiff shows substantial and actual damages. Moreover,
subject to the limited exceptions already noted, courts should deny injunctive relief for
subsurface trespass."). It is difficult to conceive, at least in the shale gas extraction
context, how horizontal drilling that encroaches into subsurface property of another,
either by a well bore or via injection of fracing fluid, could be interpreted as anything
other than an actionable trespass. The very purpose of the HVHF process would be to
remove the gas and market it. Professor Anderson does not address "judicial taking"
theory which may be relevant to his view of the power of courts to interpret common law
property rights. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2603 (2010). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Alito, wrote that the assertion that courts need flexibility to change
the common law has "little appeal when directed against the enforcement of a
constitutional guarantee ....
Id. at 2609 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy,
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It is also possible that government activities on nearby land could
physically impact nearby properties making it impossible to carry on
shale gas-related drilling and production operations. For example, as in
the case involving the government-caused flooding of private land, state
actions that cause foreign material to enter private land and significantly
disrupt shale gas activities would likely be held a per se physical taking.
One would expect that because of the bright line nature of the Loretto
categorical takings rule, legislators and government managers would be
careful to avoid such invasions. Care would be especially appropriate
because of the extraordinarily high compensation that might accrue
should a court find that the value of shale gas ownership and production
rights has been "taken."
B.

Regulatory Takings Analysis under Penn Central and Lucas

As explained above, Lucas established a second categorical rule
applicable to regulations that deprive an owner of "all economically
beneficial use" of one's property; just compensation must accompany
such a "total regulatory taking." 60 The Lucas total taking rule included
an important caveat-the nuisance exception-discussed below. Under
that exception, to the extent that "background principles of nuisance and
property law" independently restrict the owner's intended use of the
property, the regulatory action is not to be considered a compensable
taking, but rather a non-compensable legitimate exercise of a State's
police power.6 1 In those cases where no categorical rule applies, the
appropriate standards guiding judicial assessment of regulatory takings
claims are found in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York.
1.

Lucas Facts

David Lucas, a real estate developer, purchased a fee simple interest
in two residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island intending to
62
build single-family homes like those on immediately adjacent parcels.
At the time of the purchase, the lots were not subject to regulation under

joined by Justice Sotomayor, found that "[s]tate courts generally operate under a
common-law tradition that allows for incremental modifications to property law, but 'this
tradition cannot justify a carte blanch judicial authority to change property definitions
wholly free of constitutional limitations."' Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original) (quoting Roderick E. Walston,
The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings,
2001 UTAH L. REv. 379, 435 (2001)).
60. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
61. Id. at 1026-32.
62. Id at 1006-07.
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the State's coastal zone building permit regulations.63 Two years later,
the South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act
("BMA"). 4 Provisions of the BMA prohibited construction of any
permanent habitable structures on the two lots.65
Lucas sued the South Carolina Coastal Council in state court. The
Council was the regulatory agency charged with enforcing the BMA.
The developer alleged that the Council's construction ban deprived him
of all economically viable use of his land and that, consequently, his
property had been taken in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 66 He argued that "complete extinguishment" of the value
of his two lots triggered the constitutional compensation requirement,
even though the coastal zoning law may have substantially advanced an
important and valid public interest. 67 The State trial court found that the
two lots were rendered "valueless by the statute"6 8 and entered a
judgment for Lucas of more than $1.2 million.
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed.70 It held
that the coastal zoning law was a valid exercise of the State's police
power to regulate nuisance-like activities. The Court's opinion found
important Lucas's concession "that the Beachfront Management Act
63.

Id.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39 (1987).
65. Speaking for the Lucas majority, Justice Scalia observed:
The Beachfront Management Act brought Lucas's plans to an abrupt end.
Under that 1988 legislation, the Council was directed to establish a "baseline"
connecting the landward-most "point[s] of erosion ... during the past forty
years" in the region of the Isle of Palms that includes Lucas's lots. In action not
challenged here, the Council fixed this baseline landward of Lucas's parcels.
That was significant, for under the Act construction of occupable
improvements was flatly prohibited seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward
of, and parallel to, the baseline. The Act provided no exceptions.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-09 (citations omitted) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991)). The Act allowed construction of non-habitable
improvements including "wooden walkways no larger in width than six feet," and "small
wooden decks no larger than one hundred forty-four square feet." S.C. CODE ANN. § 4839-290 (1987).
66. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009.
67. Id.
68. The trial court found that "at the time Lucas purchased the two lots, both were
zoned for single-family residential construction and . . . there were no restrictions
imposed upon such use of the property by either the State of South Carolina, the County
of Charleston, or the Town of the Isle of Palms." Id. The court further found that the
BMA permanently banned construction of houses on the developers' lots. Thus, Lucas
could make no "reasonable economic use of the lots . . . [and the BMA] eliminated the
unrestricted right of use" thereby rendering them valueless. Id.
69. Id. Upon remand the state court held that the Act caused the developers' land to
be "taken," and ordered the Coastal Council to pay "just compensation" in the amount of
$1,232,387.50. Id.
70. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 896.
64.
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[was] properly and validly designed to preserve ... South Carolina's
beaches."" The State Court's rejection of the developer's taking claim
reflected long-established state law recognizing that government
regulation intended to prevent "harmful or noxious uses" of propertypublic nuisances-did not trigger the Constitution's just compensation
obligation under the Takings Clause.72
2.

Lucas Holding

The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with the South
Carolina Supreme Court, holding that "when ... a regulation that
declares 'off-limits' all economically productive or beneficial uses of
land goes beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate,
compensation must be paid to sustain it."73 Lucas defined "relevant
background principles" as "the restrictions that background principles of
the State's law of property and nuisance ... place upon land ownership,"
including the State's common law of private and public nuisance.74
Writing for the Lucas majority, Justice Scalia alluded to "numerous
occasions" on which the Court had previously said that "the Fifth
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation. .. 'denies an owner
economically viable use of his land."'75 A "total taking" or "wipeout" of
fee simple interests in land must be "guided by the understandings of our
citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle
of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property," Lucas
explained.76 It is noteworthy that Lucas viewed the South Carolina BMA
as "land use regulation" rather than an effort to prevent the creation of a
common law nuisance.
All of the Court's modem taking cases require the property alleged
to have been taken to be specifically identified before a judicial
assessment is made as to whether compensation is required. Lucas was
71. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009-10. The state supreme court emphasized that Lucas
"admittedly fails to attack the validity of the Act, and therefore concedes the validity of
the legislative declaration of its 'findings' and 'policy' embodied in [the BMA]." Lucas,
404 S.E.2d at 896. The South Carolina Court thus considered itself "in no position to
question the legislative scheme or purpose." Id. at 896.
72. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)
(prohibiting excavating below the water table in order to extract gravel); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928) (involving state action that destroyed diseased cedar
trees of certain property owners to prevent the infection of apple orchards); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404 (1915) (prohibiting the manufacture of bricks near residents
in Los Angeles); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887) (prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors)).
73. Lucas, 505 U.S at 1030.
74. Id. at 1029.
75. Id. at 1019 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
76. Id. at 1027.
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no exception.7 It is important to note that the Court's opinion in Lucas
made clear its new "categorical" or "perse" takings rule was expected to
arise only in the "relatively rare," indeed, "extraordinary circumstance"
when a government regulation destroys all economic value of property. 78
In either instance, whether a statute or regulation results in the
physical occupation or the "total taking" of real property, application of
the Court's categorical per se regulatory takings rules requires just
compensation be paid, or the government action will be nullified as an
unconstitutional taking of private property.
3.

Lucas "Nuisance Exception"

As mentioned above, Lucas recognizes that regulations that prohibit
all economically beneficial use of land may withstand a taking claim if
the limitation on property use:
[I]nhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place
upon land ownership.. . in other words, do no more than duplicate
the result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law
of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary ,ower to
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
Thus, Lucas explains that regulations do not constitute a taking even
when they eliminate the only economically productive use of land-if
the owners' use of the property qualifies as a common law nuisance.
That is, when the regulation simply augments existing common law and
"does not proscribe a productive use that was previously permissible
under relevant property and nuisance principles" it does not affect a
77. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 (1997) (quoting
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922) ("'only a regulation that goes too far'
results in a taking under the Fifth Amendment")); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986) ("A court cannot determine whether a regulation has
gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes."); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015,
1019 (noting that a regulation "goes too far" and results in a taking "at least in the
extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is
permitted").
78. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018. While Lucas identified a categorical takings rule
applicable in any case where regulation totally devalues particular property, it did not
find that David Lucas had suffered a compensable taking of his two lots. Rather, the
Court remanded the case to the South Carolina court with the admonition that "South
Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit
the uses he now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found."
Id. at 1031. "Only on this showing" said the Court, "can the State fairly claim that, in
proscribing all such beneficial uses, the Beachfront Management Act is taking nothing."
Id. at 1031-32.
79. Id. at 1029.
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taking. Use of property "for what are now expressly prohibited purposes
was always unlawful, and (subject to other constitutional limitations) it
[is] open to the State at any point to make the implication of those
background principles of nuisance and property law explicit."8 0
4.

Penn Central Analysis
Expectations

of Distinct

Investment-Backed

As reviewed above, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon has been seen
as providing the first articulation of the Court's ad hoc regulatory takings
analysis:
As long recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due
process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining
such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of

eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question
depends upon the particular facts. The greatest weight is given to the

judgment of the legislature but it always is open to interested parties

to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional
81
power.
The property interest involved in Mahon was coal that had been severed
from a fee simple interest in land. 82 The coal company argued that the
state statute prohibiting mining under buildings to prevent subsidence
damage effected an unconstitutional taking of private property without
just compensation.83 The Supreme Court agreed.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City synthesized the
seminal regulatory takings principles of Mahon and the Court's postMahon regulatory takings cases in identifying the relevant considerations
to be used by courts in determining whether a compensable regulatory
taking has occurred.84 The Court stated:
[W]hether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the
government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it
depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that] case." In
engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's
decisions have identified several factors that have particular
significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1029-30. See also Freyfogel, supra note 26, at 98.
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
Id. at 412.
Id.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental
action.85

Unlike Lucas, Penn Central involved a claim of the taking of less
than a full fee simple interest in land allegedly rendered valueless by
government regulation.86 The Penn Central Company asserted that a
New York City historic landmarks preservation ordinance effected a
taking because it barred the use of airspace above the company's Grand
Central Station to construct a high-rise building. The takings claim was
based upon the theory that one hundred percent of the economic value of
the airspace owned by a company had been taken as a result of the
historic preservation law, notwithstanding the fact that Penn Central
owned the entire tract in fee simple.88 The Court characterized the
company's argument as follows:
They first observe that the airspace above the Terminal is a valuable
property interest....
They urge that the Landmarks Law has
deprived them of any gainful use of their "air rights" above the
Terminal and that, irrespective of the value of the remainder of their
parcel, the city has "taken" their right to this superjacent airspace,
thus entitling them to "just compensation" measured by the fair
market value of these air rights. 89
Thus, the Penn Central Court was called upon to identify the
"property interest" against which Penn Central's alleged loss of property
85. Id. at 124 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Among the post-Mahon cases
synthesized by the Court in Penn Central are: Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 495 (1977); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976);
YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 93 (1969); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 590 (1962); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 85 (1962); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 43 (1960); United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357
U.S. 155, 168 (1958); Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe R.R. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 346
U.S. 346, 347 (1953); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 151 (1952); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946); United States v. Willow River Power Co.,
324 U.S. 499, 503 (1945); Demorest v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 38
(1944); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928); Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183, 185 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 605 (1927); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 367 (1926). Pre-Mahon cases cited by Justice Holmes
as informing the Court's analysis are: Portsmouth HarborLand & Hotel Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327, 328 (1922); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 309
(1920); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394, 404 (1915); Reinman v. City ofLittle Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 173 (1915); Welch v.
Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 93 (1909); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 625 (1887).
86. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130.
87. Id.
88. Id
89. Id. (citations omitted).
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value was to be measured-now often referred to by courts and scholars
as the "denominator" issue.90 The Court rejected the company's
argument, declaring .'[t]aking' jurisprudence does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in
1
a particular segment have been entirely abrogated."
5.

The Denominator Issue

Consider the situation where the owner of shale gas owns only the
gas and the right to extract it by virtue of a conveyance granting or
reserving that interest from a fee simple estate. Setting aside the
nuisance exception, the owner might have a colorable takings claim
2
based on a Lucas total takings theory. 9 Such an argument would likely
trigger a judicial inquiry into "the denominator issue"-how a court
should identify "the property interest against which the loss of value is to
be measured." 93
Identifying the appropriate denominator is a threshold question for
94
Whether the amount of
courts applying the Lucas total taking rule.
property taken deprives an owner of all economically viable uses is
measured by what is taken (the numerator) against what was left (the

90. See generally Keith Woffinden, The Parcel as a Whole: A Presumptive
Structural Approach for Determining When the Government Has Gone Too Far, 2008
B.Y.U. L. REv. 623 (2008) [hereinafter Parcel as a Whole] (discussing horizontal
divisions of property and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the denominator
problem); Timothy J. Dowling, Tahoe-Sierra'sEffect on the Parcel-as-a-WholeRule and
Its Importance in Defending Against Regulatory Takings Challenges, in TAKING SIDES ON
TAKINGS IssuEs: THE IMPACT OF TAHOE-SIERRA 33 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2003)
(discussing the parcel-as-a-whole rule).

91. The opinion observed that "[w]ere this the rule this Court would have erred not
only in upholding laws restricting the development of air rights, but also in approving
those prohibiting both the subjacent and the lateral development of particular parcels."
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130 (citations omitted).
92. See Patrick C. McGinley, Bundled Rights and Reasonable Expectations:
Applying the Lucas CategoricalTaking Rule to Severed Mineral Property Interests, 11
VT. J. ENvTL. L. 525, 556-63 (2010) [hereinafter "Bundled Rights"].
93. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). The text in the
Lucas opinion referenced by footnote 7 states "the Fifth Amendment is violated when
land-use regulation . . . 'denies an owner economically viable use of his land."' Id. at
1016 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). The footnote to this
statement begins with a caveat: "Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of
all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not
make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured." Id.
at 1016 n.7. Lucas did not reach the denominator issue because the property interest
involved was a fee simple and the Court found the entire economic value of the land had
been taken. However, the Court emphasized "uncertainty regarding the composition of
the denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements
by the Court." Id.
94. See generallyParcelas a Whole, supra note 90.
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denominator). Defining the denominator too broadly would mean very
few government actions would be found to be a taking. Defining the
denominator too narrowly would result in virtually all government
regulation affecting private property being held a taking requiring
compensation, thus greatly limiting the power of government to protect
important public interests.9 5
In Penn Central,the company's right to build a structure on top of
Grand Central Station (referred to as its "air rights") was viewed by the
Court as just one part of the strand of real property ownership inuring in
a fee simple estate. The Court brushed aside the Penn Central
Company's argument that one hundred percent of the air rights had been
taken:
[T]he submission that appellants may establish a "taking" simply by
showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property
interest that they heretofore had believed was available for
development is quite simply untenable .... "Taking "jurisprudence
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particularsegment have been entirely
96
abrogated.

Though the observation that "taking jurisprudence does not divide a
single parcel into discrete segments. . ." seemed clear, Lucas muddied

the waters. In footnote dicta, the Court observed:
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of
a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would
analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of
all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or
as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of
the tract as a whole.97

95. See John E. Fee, Unearthingthe Denominatorin Regulatory Takings Claims, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1994).
96. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130 (emphasis added). See Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500 (1987). In Keystone, the takings claimants
argued that a Pennsylvania law prohibiting coal companies from mining underground
coal in such a manner as to cause subsidence of surface lands, reduced to zero an estate in
land they owned-the support estate. The court refused to consider the support estate as
the denominator in its takings analysis emphasizing that "[t]o focus upon the support
estate separately when addressing the diminution of the value of plaintiffs' property
caused by the Subsidence Act therefore would serve little purpose. The support estate is
more properly viewed as only one "strand" in the plaintiffs "bundle" of property rights,
which also includes the mineral estate." Id. at 480. "It is clear . . ." said the Court "that
our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a
bundle of property rights." Id.
97. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
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This dicta applies only to a fee simple estate in land as that was the
focus of the case presented by the Lucas facts. The Court did not
actually reach the denominator issue because the property interest
involved was a fee simple. The Court accepted the South Carolina trial
court's finding that one hundred percent of the economic value of David
98
Lucas's two residential lots had been taken.
APPLYING REGULATORY TAKING ANALYSIS TO GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF SHALE GAS OPERATIONS

V.

Beyond the limited scenarios involving physical occupation under
Loretto, a more likely, though equally limited context in which a
regulatory taking claim might arise is where a shale gas owner alleges a
Lucas total taking that deprives "all economically beneficial use" of her
property. 99 As explained below, successfully making a takings claim
under the Lucas per se rule is problematic. Even where the only interest
of the takings claimant is in a severed mineral interest in shale gas and
the right to extract and market the gas, the Lucas nuisance exception may
stymie claims for compensation under the takings clause.
A.

Per Se Total Takings Where the ClaimantOwns the Surface and
Shale Gas Rights

The scope of application of the Lucas "total taking" rule is limited
by the unusual facts of the case. The South Carolina trial court found as
a fact that the entire value of David Lucas's two residential lots had been
taken and that no economically beneficial use of the parcels existed
because of the application of the state coastal zoning law. The impact of
government regulation in Lucas was quite unlike most government
regulations that devalue property. Generally, when regulation decreases
the economic value of real property, the land continues to retain a
measure of economic value for uses other than those proscribed. Lucas,
then, was an anomaly in that the challenged state regulation reduced the
value of the claimant's property to zero-a "total taking." That is
precisely why the Lucas Court indicated that its total taking rule would
apply to the "rare situation" where regulation destroyed all value of a fee
100
simple interest.
It is apparent that where the owner of shale gas rights also owns the
surface, in almost all instances the surface will have some significant

98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 1019.
Id.
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economic value over and above the value of the underlying gas.1ot
Simply put, in such a factual setting, the Lucas total taking analysis
would not apply because the property owner would have some remaining
economically beneficial use(s) of her property. It will be the rare case
where a government regulation of shale gas-related activities will deprive
the owner of both surface and shale gas rights of all economically
beneficial uses of her property.
B.

Consideringthe DenominatorIssue in Shale Gas Regulatory
Takings
1.

Severed Mineral Interests in Shale Gas Should be Treated
Differently than the Fee Simple Interest Involved in Lucas

The denominator issue has not been resolved by the Supreme Court
in more than three decades since it first was articulated in Penn Central.
It would be little more than speculation to attempt to predict the outcome
of future regulatory takings cases where shale gas ownership is severed
from a fee interest, and identification of the proper denominator becomes
an issue. The present state of the law does, however, provide a measure
of guidance when applied to some contexts.
First, however the denominator is identified-even if a government
regulation renders the value of one's shale gas property valueless-if the
government action was intended to forestall harm to public interests in
the nature of a common law nuisance, no per se taking will be found.
Second, until modified, the Supreme Court's taking jurisprudence
requires that total takings be judged "by the property as a whole."
Both points are driven home in a case involving a government ban
on coal mining to prevent pollution of a small Pennsylvania watershed.
Owners of a severed coal estate possessing no surface rights over part of
the coal tract, claimed the ban affected a total taking. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania rejected this argument in Machipongo Land and
Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, ruling that the "'property as a whole rule'
remains controlling" in view of prevailing United States Supreme Court
precedent.10 2 Applying that rule, the Court held that the relevant parcel
101. See, e.g., Machipongo Land and Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa.
2002).
102. Id. at 766 (citing Keystone, Penn Central,and Tahoe-Sierra). In choosing the
"property as a whole" analytical approach, the Pennsylvania Court recognized that
cases
involving severed mineral and other estates in land can be characterized in a number of
ways: "(1) the horizontal, physical division of property--is the relevant parcel all the land
in a given geographic area that one owns or some smaller portion of that acreage; (2) the
vertical division of property--can the parcel be divided among air rights, surface
rights,
and mineral rights; or (3) the temporal division of property--can the property be viewed
in discrete temporal units." Id. (citations omitted). The Court further held, however, if
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at issue "cannot be vertically segmented and must be defined to include
03
both the surface and mineral rights."
In an earlier essay on takings and severed mineral interests, I
addressed the application of the Lucas per se rule to severed coal
property interests. I concluded that "quite unlike the interest of David
Lucas or, indeed, most owners of a fee simple estate in land," severed
coal property interests do not deserve the same level of protection
afforded owners of fee simple estates in land by Lucas's per se rule. In
reaching this conclusion, I analyzed the history of the severance of coal
interests from fee simple estates in land and found a significant
distinction between the economic expectations of owners of land in fee
simple and owners of severed coal interests.104
Similarly, I submit that there is a significant difference between fee
simple ownership of land and ownership of rights to extract and market
shale gas. The distinct difference between the investment-backed
expectations of the owner of a fee simple interest in land and the
economic expectations of an owner of severed mineral interests militates
in favor of application of the Penn Central analysis. That analysis is
grounded upon the view that speculative investments in severed estates
105
in land are not entitled to the same protection as fee simple interests.
Moreover, courts reviewing regulatory taking claims should be alert
to the possibility that some involved in the shale gas boom may attempt
to sever shale gas property interests by slicing them into smaller and
smaller parcels and seek to "game" the Lucas rule by manipulating
fractional property interests to facilitate total takings claims. As Justice
may
Stevens's dissent in Lucas predicted, "developers and investors
106
rule.
new
Court's
the
of
advantage
take
to
market specialized estates

the government regulation falls within the Lucas nuisance exception, the per se rule is
inapplicable.
103. Id. at 768. Machipongo adopted a "flexible approach, designed to account for
factual nuances." That approach involved a balanced analysis of a variety of factors in
determining how to define the relevant parcel; that approach did not recognize one factor
as more important than any other. Among the factors identified by the Court were "unity
and contiguity of ownership, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the proposed
parcel has been treated as a single unit, the extent to which the regulated holding benefits
the unregulated holdings; the timing of transfers, if any, in light of the developing
regulatory environment; the owner's investment backed-expectations; and, the
landowner's plans for development." Id.
104. Bundled Rights, supra note 92.
105. See id.
106. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1065-66 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See also Echeverria, supra note 41, at 174 ("[T]he per se Lucas rule is
potentially subject to artful manipulation by clever investors who can structure land
acquisitions in order to manufacture apparent regulatory wipeouts and create potential
claims under that precedent.").
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"The smaller the estate," Justice Stevens emphasized, "the more likely
that a regulatory change will effect a total taking."'0o
2.

Penn Central's Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations
Inquiry Applies to Claims of Total Taking of Shale Gas
Interests

With one exception, the Supreme Court has been silent since Lucas
regarding clarification of the denominator issue. 08 However, lower
courts have expressed opinions on the issue. Some courts have held that
when only a portion of a real property interest has been taken-for
example where a regulation makes it impossible to mine one of several
contiguous tracts of a severed coal seam-the "denominator" is the
amount of coal that cannot be mined (100%) under the affected tract, and
the Lucas per se rule applies.' 0 9 These courts find a taking and require

107. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065-66. Justice Stevens provided a hypothetical example:
[A]n investor may, for example, purchase the right to build a multifamily home
on a specific lot, with the result that a zoning regulation that allows only singlefamily homes would render the investor's property interest "valueless." In
short, tl~e categorical rule will likely have one of two effects: either courts will
alter the\definition of the "denominator" in the takings "fraction," rendering the
Court's categorical rule meaningless, or investors will manipulate the relevant
property interests, giving the Court's rule sweeping effect. To my mind,
neither of these results is desirable or appropriate, and both are distortions of
our takings jurisprudence.
108. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), in which the Court held that
the Lucas per se rule was inapplicable even though the value of the claimant's land was
reduced by 93.7/o-from $3.15 million to $200,000-as a result of the state's regulation.
Id. at 616, 631. The Court referred to a "persisting question of what is that proper
denominator in the takings fraction. . . . Some of our cases indicate that the extent of
deprivation effected by a regulatory action is measured against the value of the parcel as
a whole. . . ." Id. at 631 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 497 (1987). "[B]ut we have at times expressed discomfort with the logic of this
rule." Id. (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7). "The issue was not properly raised
below in the state courts nor presented in the petition for certiorari." Id. Palazzolo was
decided "on the premise that petitioner's entire parcel serves as the basis for this takings
claim, and, so framed, the total deprivation argument fails." Id.
109. See Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States (Cane 1), 44 Fed. Cl. 785 (1999); Cane
Tenn., Inc. v. United States (Cane II), 54 Fed. Cl. 100 (2002); Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United
States (Cane Ill), 57 Fed. Cl. 115 (2003); Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States (Cane IV), 62
Fed. Cl. 481 (2003); Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States (Cane V), 60 Fed. Cl. 694 (2004);
Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States (Cane VI), 62 Fed. Cl. 703 (2004); Cane Tenn., Inc. v.
United States (Cane VIl), 63 Fed. Cl. 715 (2005); Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States (Cane
VIIl), 71 Fed. Cl. 432 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 214 Fed. Appx. 978, (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Further background facts may be found in decisions involving earlier takings claims
involving the same property. See Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
rev'd, E. Minerals Int'l Inc. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 541 (1996). See Kristine
Tardiff, Expectations: The Final Lucas Frontier, 11th Annual CLE Conference on
Litigating Regulatory Takings and Other Challenges To Land Use and Environmental
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compensation without reference to the more generally applicable takings

standards of Penn Central. Other lower courts have held that Penn
Central does apply to total takings claims, even if the evidence shows
110 In my
that the affected property interest has been reduced to zero.
view, the better argument is that Penn Central should apply in those
unusual cases where a takings claimant can show that government
regulation has reduced the value of a severed mineral estate to zero.
An opinion of the Federal Circuit cogently articulates the rationale
for applying Penn Centralto Lucas total takings claims:
Lucas did not mean to eliminate the requirement for reasonable,
investment-backed expectations to establish a taking. It is true
that . . . Lucas set out what it called a "categorical" taking "where
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land." The Lucas Court, however, clarified that by "categorical" it
meant those "categories of regulatory action [that are] compensable
without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in
A Lucas-type taking, therefore, is
support of the restraint."
categorical only in the sense that the courts do not balance the
importance of the public interest advanced by the regulation against
the regulation's imposition on private property rights.... The Lucas
Court did not hold that the denial of all economically beneficial or
productive use of land eliminates the requirement that the landowner
have reasonable, investment-backed expectations of developing his
land. In Lucas, there was no question of whether the plaintiff had
satisfied that criterion.III
It is quite clear the Lucas holding applies narrowly to claims of
takings of fee simple interests in real property. The "infamous footnote
7" of Lucas clearly states that the issue of total taking of lesser interests
Regulation (Stanford, CA., November 6-7, 2008) at 12-17, for a detailed description of

this complex litigation and an explanation of the courts' decisions.
110. See, e.g., Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2004) ("It is a settled principle of federal takings law that under the Penn Centralanalytic
framework, the government may defend against liability by claiming that the regulated
activity constituted a state law nuisance without regard to the other Penn Central
factors."); Coal. for Gov't Procurement v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 365 F.3d 435, 481 (6th
Cir. 2004) (indicating that the first step in a Penn Central takings inquiry is to determine
whether claimant has a cognizable property interest as defined by Lucas); M & J Coal
Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding "the Lucas
formulation is useful for analyzing takings claims involving land use restrictions even
when deprivation is not complete; specifically, there can be no compensable interference
if such land use was not permitted at the time the owner took title to the property."). See
also DOUGLAS T. KENDALL ET AL., TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK: DEFENDING TAKINGS

CHALLENGES TO LAND USE REGULATIONS 117 (2000) (explaining that a defense based

upon background principles of nuisance and property law is applicable to all inverse
condemnation claims).
111. Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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in land was reserved for another day.1 2 When that day comes regarding
claims of total takings of severed shale gas interests, there are strong
arguments that the court should consider the distinct investment-backed
expectations of the claimant under Penn Central,rather than limiting the
takings analysis solely to a determination of the denominator to apply to
less than a fee simple interest in land. Refusing to consider investmentbacked expectations of the shale gas owner would have the perverse
effect of encouraging the manipulation of mineral (and other) property
rights to allow broader constitutional protection than is afforded fee
simple owners of real property.
In his Lucas concurrence, Justice Kennedy said "[p]roperty is
bought and sold, investments are made, subject to the State's power to
regulate."'"3 "Where a taking is alleged from regulations which deprive
the property of all value ... the test must be whether the deprivation is
contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations."ll 4 Seizing on
this point and connecting it to Penn Central, Justice Kennedy observed
that "the finding of no value must be considered under the Takings
Clause by reference to the owner's reasonable, investment-backed
expectations."s Justice Kennedy's observation has merit, given that
three years ago very few individuals knew of the potential to exploit
shale gas. As the bonanza potential of shale gas has begun to surface in
the public consciousness, serious issues relating to the short and longterm costs of exploitation of the resource remain unresolved.
C.

Shale Gas and the Lucas Nuisance Exception
1.

Allegations of Shale Gas Operations-Related Environmental
Impacts

The harms that shale gas development may cause, or allegedly
cause, fall within traditional concepts of common law nuisance. Critics
of shale gas development identify a litany of harms they assert

112. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. The description of footnote 7 as "infamous"
captures the perspectives of critics of Justice Scalia's dicta that suggests further takings
clause limitation of government land use regulation when the Court finally resolves the
"denominator" issue. Professor David Callies is the source of this descriptive term. See
David L. Callies, After Lucas and Dolan: An Introductory Essay, in TAKINGS LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 15
(David L. Callies ed., 1996).
113. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
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accompany shale gas extraction operations.'" 6 Without suggesting
agreement that such externalities are common or occur at all, legal
analysis of potential obstacles attendant shale gas exploration, drilling,
road building, and transportation must include consideration of potential
common law nuisance liability exposure. Such analysis necessarily
implicates issues involved in determining whether the impact of certain
forms of regulation constitute per se takings under Lucas principles.
For example, critics have alleged that shale gas development can
cause diverse harms including contamination of ground water, soil
erosion and stream sedimentation, explosions during drilling and
production activities, pollution of streams and domestic and municipal
water supplies, toxic emissions from shale gas transmission facilities,
and noxious noise and odors. Other nuisance-like effects of gas shale
operations have been suggested."' 7 These include impacts to water
resources,"' floodplains," 9 freshwater wetlands,12 0 ecosystems and

116. For examples of various assertions of adverse impacts of shale gas operations on
important public and private interests, see generally Fracking: Gas Drilling's
Environmental Threat (a series of articles exploring environmental concerns about shale
gas operations) (ProPublica, 2011), available at http://www.propublica.org/series/
fracking. See also RAISING ELIJAH, supra note 7, at 272-84.

117. For a government agency's non-exhaustive list of potential harmful, nuisancelike externalities of shale gas extraction, see New York State Dep't. of Environmental
Conservation, Preliminary Revised Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact
Statement on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Program: Well Permit
Issuancefor HorizontalDrilling and High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturingto Develop the
Marcellus Shale and Other Low-Permeability Gas Reservoirs, at ch. 6. (July, 2011),
Executive Summary, at 10 [hereinafter PRDSG-EIS]. The PRDSG-EIS is available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/ogprdsgeisfull.pdf.
118. Id. at ch. 6.1 (discussing stormwater runoff, surface spills and releases at the well
pad, hydraulic fracturing procedure, waste transport, fluid discharges, solids disposal).
HVHF requires more than 3 million gallons or more of fresh water per well. The
PRDSG-EIS estimates, "based upon multiplying the peak projected annual wells by
current average use per well results in calculated peak annual fresh water usage for highvolume hydraulic fracturing of 9 billion gallons." The PRDSG-EIS explains that fresh
water for hydraulic fracturing may be obtained by withdrawing it from surface water
bodies a distance away from the well pad or through new or existing water-supply wells
drilled into aquifers. "Without proper controls on the rate, timing and location of such
water withdrawals, the cumulative impacts of such withdrawals could cause
modifications to groundwater levels, surface water levels, and stream flow that could
result in significant adverse impacts, including but not limited to impacts to the aquatic
ecosystem, downstream river channel and riparian resources, wetlands, and aquifer
supplies," according to the PRDSG-EIS. Also, the draft New York report indicates that
"at peak activity the cumulative impact of high-volume hydraulic fracturing could
potentially be significant, if such withdrawals were temporally proximate and from the
same water resource." Id., Executive Summary at 9-10.
119. Id. at ch. 6.2.
120. Id. at ch. 6.3.
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wildlife,121 air quality,122 greenhouse gas emissions, 123 naturally occurring
radioactive materials in the Marcellus Shale,12 4 visual impacts,125
noise, 12 6 road use,127 community character impacts,128 and seismicity.129
In addition, HVHF utilizes a variety of chemicals mixed with fresh and
flowback water shot under high pressures deep underground to the shale
gas zone. The possibility of the escape of these polluted fluids has raised
concerns.13 0 This is not intended as an exhaustive list of possible shale
gas externalities that fit within the Lucas description of activities
triggering the nuisance exception.131
121. Id. at ch. 6.4 (discussing impacts of fragmentation to terrestrial habitats and
wildlife and invasive species).
122. Id. at ch. 6.5 (discussing regulatory review, air quality impact assessment,
regional emissions of ozone precursors and their effects on the attainment status in the
state implementation plan, air quality monitoring requirements for marcellus shale
activities, permitting approach to the well pad and compressor station operations).
123. Id. at ch. 6.6 (discussing greenhouse gases, emissions from oil and gas
operations, emissions source characterization, emission rates, drilling rig mobilization,
site preparation and demobilization, completion rig mobilization and demobilization, well
drilling, well completion, well production, and a summary of GHG emissions).
124. Id. at ch. 6.7.
125. Id. at ch. 6.8.
126. Id at ch. 6.9.
127. Id. at ch. 6.10.
128. Id. at ch. 6.11.
129. Id. at ch. 6.12.
130. According to the PRDSG-EIS, spills or releases of HVHF contaminants might
harm surface and groundwater:
[S]pills or releases in connection with HVHF could have significant adverse
impacts on water resources. A significant number of contaminants are
contained in fracturing additives, or otherwise associated with HVHF
operations. Spills or releases can occur as a result of tank ruptures, equipment
or surface impoundment failures, overfills, vandalism, accidents (including
vehicle collisions), ground fires, or improper operations. Spilled, leaked or
released fluids could flow to a surface water body or infiltrate the ground,
reaching subsurface soils and aquifers. Also assessed were the potential
significant adverse impacts on groundwater resources from well drilling and
construction associated with HVHF include impacts from turbidity, fluids
pumped into or flowing from rock formations penetrated by the well, and
contamination from natural gas present in the rock formations penetrated by the
well.
Id. at 10.
131. I do not intend to suggest that these impacts necessarily or commonly attend
shale gas operations. Evidence of such impacts will be based upon objective crossdisciplinary studies generated by experts in the fields of geohydrology, physics,
petroleum engineering, economics and the ecological sciences. Of course, some adverse
impacts may be proven by lay testimony; a stream littered with dead fish, foul smelling
drinking water or noxious ambient air could provide probative evidence of adverse
effects of shale gas extraction activities. In Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon Justice Holmes
emphasized that whether a compensable taking has occurred "depends upon the particular
facts" and "this is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions." Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 416 (1922).
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Nuisance Exception: Eligibility of Regulatory Action

In making the argument that loss of all economically beneficial use
of shale property gas rights caused by a regulatory mandate should not be
held a taking, the government must provide ample evidence that the
taking claimant's land use activities fall within Lucas's nuisance
exception.
The mere allegation that shale HVHF operations contaminate
groundwater used for domestic drinking or livestock watering will not
suffice to substantiate a nuisance exception defense to a regulatory taking
claim. As a general rule, a common law private or public nuisance must
be established by evidence of a risk or probable risk of the occurrence of
harm 13 2 in the form of a substantial and unreasonable interference with
34
the use of another's land 33 or with rights common to the public.1
Lucas provides helpful direction as to the type and quantum of
evidence a government regulator must tender for a court to reject a
takings claim and uphold a challenged regulation as a valid police power
initiative:
[T]o win its case South Carolina must do more than proffer the
legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent
with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a
common-law maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. . .

Instead, as it would be required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in
a common-law action for public nuisance, South Carolina must
identify background principles of nuisance and property law that
in the circumstances in which the
prohibit the uses he now intends
35
found.1
presently
is
property

132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979) ("There is liability for a
nuisance only to those to whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that would be
suffered by a normal person in the community or by property in normal condition and
used for a normal purpose").
133. See id. § 821D ("A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.").
134. See id § 821B(1) ("A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a
right common to the general public."). See also id. § 82 1B(2) ("Circumstances that may
sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable include ...
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the
public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation,
or (c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or longlasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon
the public right.").
135. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992). Lucas looked to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts to provide guidance regarding the evidence needed to
defeat a "total takings" claim via the nuisance exception:
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Instead of changing takings law to favor land owners over
government regulators, the Lucas nuisance exception is best seen as
creating an affirmative defense that has been relied upon as the basis for
judicial rejection of regulatory takings claims.
Professor Blumm and Lucas Richie explain:
Rather than heralding in a new era of landowner compensation or
government deregulation, Lucas instead spawned a surprising rise of
categorical defenses to takings claims in which governments can
defeat compensation suits without case-specific inquiries into the
economic effects and public purposes of regulations.
Lucas
accomplished this by establishing the prerequisite that a claimant
must first demonstrate that its property interest was unrestrained by
prior restrictions. The decision suggested that those restrictions had
to be imposed by common law courts interpreting state nuisance and
property law, but Lucas has not been interpreted by either the lower
courts or the Supreme Court so narrowly.
Pollution of land, water, and air during mineral extraction generally
rises to the level of a public or private nuisance. Illustrative is
Machipongo Land and Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a lower court's determination that
a state environmental agency's ban on coal mining in a pristine
watershed constituted a regulatory taking.137 The court stressed that
while coal mining might not constitute a nuisance per se, "experts need
not wait until acid mine water flows out of mines in the area to predict
The "total taking" inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail (as the
application of state nuisance law ordinarily entails) analysis of, among other
things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private
property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826, 827, the social value of the claimant's activities and
their suitability to the locality in question, see, e.g., id, §§ 828(a) and (b), 831,
and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided through
measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent private
landowners) alike, see, e.g., id., §§ 827(e), 828(c), 830. The fact that a
particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily
imports a lack of any common-law prohibition (though changed circumstances
or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so,
see id, § 827, Comment g. So also does the fact that other landowners,
similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant.
Id. at 1030-31. Where the facts do not support a total takings claim, judicial application
of the Penn Central takings calculus should be substantially more deferential to
government regulation that seeks to forestall gas shale activities that may create a public
or private nuisance.
136. Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principlesas CategoricalTakings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 321,
322 (2005).
137. Machipongo Land and Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002).
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the likely results of mining this land." 3 8 With a nod to the necessity of
preventing harm like water pollution before it starts, the court found it
"beyond dispute that the resources needed to correct pollution once it has
occurred are far greater than those needed to prevent it."'3
It is not difficult, then, to appreciate that in cases involving shale
gas operations, a government entity might marshal sufficient proof to
sustain its evidentiary burden to prove entitlement to the Lucas nuisance
exception. General observations regarding common law nuisance limits
on mineral extraction activities lead the discussion to specific concerns
about HVHF shale gas extraction contamination of water resources.
HVHF operations that pollute streams or water supplies used by the
public exemplify the type of activity that may be banned or enjoined as a
public or private nuisance.14 0 As mentioned above, one state regulatory
agency report has identified specific potential significant adverse impacts
of hydraulic fracturing on water resources including harm caused by
water withdrawals for HVHF.141
Lucas reminds courts that regulation of property uses fall within a
government's broad police powers. When adequate evidence supports
the assertion that a law or regulation is intended to protect the public
from common law nuisance-like activities,14 2 a court must recognize the
legitimacy of the use of the police power to minimize or prohibit the
negative impacts of the activity. Thus, when the government produces
138. Id. at 775.
139. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania observed:
While the Commonwealth contends that mining would, in addition to
destroying the trout population, adversely affecting the use of the stream as a
water supply, the nature of the public use of the water should not be the focus
of our inquiry. To the contrary, we have explained that "we believe that the
public has a sufficient interest in clean streams alone regardless of any specific
use thereof . . . [to warrant]

injunctive relief."

Accordingly, if the

Commonwealth is able to show that the Property Owners' proposed use
[discharge of coal mine drainage] of the stream would unreasonably interfere
with the public right to unpolluted water, the use, as a nuisance, may be
prohibited without compensation, citing, Barnes & Tucker I, 319 A.2d at 882
(preserving the water from acid mine runoff despite the fact that the only use of
the water was recreational).
140. Examples of possible sources of HVHF-caused water resource contamination
include, "[a]ll phases of natural gas well development, from initial land clearing for
access roads, equipment staging areas and well pads, to drilling and fracturing operations,
production and final reclamation." Each has "the potential to cause water resource
impacts during rain and snow melt events if stormwater is not properly managed."
PRDSG-EIS, supra note 117, at 10.
141. See discussion at footnote 118 supra, citing, PRDSG-EIS at 9-10 and Ch. 6.1.
142. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) ("A law or decree
with such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could
have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected
persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.").
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adequate evidence of the nuisance character of a regulated shale gas
extraction activity, a court must deny a regulatory taking claim of a
constitutional right of compensation even if the regulation renders shale
gas drilling rights worthless.
D. Applying Penn CentralAnalysis to Shale Gas Takings Claims
In regulatory cases similar to Penn Central where less than total
economic deprivation has occurred, the application of the Lucas
background principles nuisance exception is a threshold issue that can be
outcome determinative.143 A finding by the court that the regulation is
consistent with background principles ends the inquiry and requires the
regulatory taking claim to be rejected. The nuisance exception defense
to takings claims allows governments, as Professor Blumm observed, to
defeat compensation suits without case-specific inquiries into the
economic effects and public purposes of regulations."1 4 4
The Penn Central calculus analyzes the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character
of the governmental action. Thus, Penn Central comes into play
(1) when challenged regulatory action is not a total taking and (2) the
regulated land use activity falls outside basic background principles of
property and nuisance law. Generally, such regulation would fall in the
category of land use or zoning restrictions.
As noted below, in cases where a zoning or other land use
regulation limits shale gas extraction activities to certain areas of a
community, a court should consider the economic impact of the
regulation. Court's should be mindful of the fact that even where the
diminution of value of a property right seems extreme, the amount of the
diminution is not outcome determinative. For example, in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, the Supreme Court of the United States found a 97%

143. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 136, in which the authors observe:
Courts in multiple jurisdictions have determined that Lucas's threshold inquiry
applies not only to Lucas-style complete economic wipeout takings, but also to
physical occupation cases and, more importantly, to Penn Central-type
regulatory cases where less than total economic deprivation has occurred.
Consequently, the first question a court must address in any takings case
(whether a Lucas, Penn Central, or physical occupation scenario) is whether
the property use at issue was in fact one of the sticks in the bundle of rights
acquired by the owner. If the contested use was not authorized by the
claimant's title at purchase, a court should reject the takings claim at the
threshold level.
Id. at 327 (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 322.
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reduction in value of the taking claimant's land did not result in a

regulatory taking.145
The second prong of the Penn Central test would direct the
reviewing

court's

attention

to

the

distinct

investment-backed

expectations of those who have a financial interest in shale gas
properties. At this seminal stage of shale gas development, it seems
evident that investment in shale gas property is speculative-so
speculative that some in the industry have raised serious questions about
the long-term viability of the new business.146 Whether the expectations
of shale gas property owners bear fruit depends in significant measure
upon the identification of short and long-term costs and risks as well as
the extent to which government regulation is deemed necessary to protect
important public interests. The ultimate value of shale gas property
rights can be expected to fluctuate-fueled in part by market
speculation. 147
E.

Legislative ProhibitionofShale Gas-RelatedOperations
1.

Land Use Regulation

While such situations will likely be limited, one scenario that could
bring the Lucas per se "total taking" rule into play is a local government
zoning or other land use ordinance barring all natural gas drilling and
production activities. Serious concerns about the possible adverse
impacts of gas shale production have, in fact, already fueled local
legislative action in Pennsylvania and elsewhere.148 For example, in

145. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 622-23 (2001).
146. See Insiders Sound Alarm, supra note 23:
In the e-mails, energy executives, industry lawyers, state geologists and market
analysts voice skepticism about lofty forecasts and question whether companies
are intentionally, and even illegally, overstating the productivity of their wells
and the size of their reserves. Many of these e-mails also suggest a view that is
in stark contrast to more bullish public comments made by the industry, in
much the same way that insiders have raised doubts about previous financial
bubbles.
147. Moreover, courts must be on notice of the potential for property owners to sever
shale gas interests by slicing them into smaller and smaller parcels. Such segmentation
of real estate ownership provides the opportunity to "game" the system allowing
manipulation of property interests to facilitate total takings claims. As Justice Stevens's
dissent in Lucas predicted, "developers and investors may market specialized estates to
take advantage of the Court's new rule." "The smaller the estate," Justice Stevens
emphasized, "the more likely that a regulatory change will effect a total taking." Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1065.
148. R. Marcus Cady II, Drilling into the Issues: A Critical Analysis of Urban
Drilling's Legal, Environmental, and Regulatory Implications, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 127 (2009); Timothy Rile, Wrangling with Urban Wildcatters: Defending Texas

230

PENN STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:2

December 2010, the City Council of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania enacted an
ordinance banning all natural gas drilling and production activities within
the city.14 9 The City of Buffalo, New York, enacted a similar measure,
and other local government bodies are considering like legislative
action.'so
The Pittsburgh ordinance appears to conflict with a
Commonwealth statute preempting local government regulation of oil
and natural gas drilling to the extent it purports to ban such operations
anywhere within the city.15 1 A more narrowly drawn ordinance would
likely avoid the preemption pitfall.152

Municipal Oil and Gas Development Ordinances Against Regulatory Takings
Challenges, 32 VT. L. REV. 349 (2007).
149. PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE § 618 (2010). The Ordinance expresses the legislative
intent of the City Council:
The City Council of Pittsburgh finds that the commercial extraction of natural
gas in the urban environment of Pittsburgh poses a significant threat to the
health, safety, and welfare of residents and neighborhoods within the City.
Moreover, widespread environmental and human health impacts have resulted
from commercial gas extraction in other areas. Regulating the activity of
commercial gas extraction automatically means allowing commercial gas
extraction to occur within the City, thus allowing the deposition of toxins into
the air, soil, water, environment, and the bodies of residents within our
City....
The City Council recognizes that environmental and economic
sustainability cannot be achieved if the rights of municipal majorities are
routinely overridden by corporate minorities claiming certain legal powers.
The text of the ordinance is available at http://pittsburgh.legistar.com/Legislation
Detail.aspx?ID=766814&GUID=3306COFD.
150. See Buffalo Council Votes to Ban 'Hydrofracking',BUFFALONEWS.COM, (Feb. 9,
2011), http://www.buffalonews.com/wire-feeds/state/article336970.ece.
The City of
Buffalo ordinance is available at http://ia600403.us.archive.org/10/items/BuffaloNatural
GasExtractionProhibition/OrdAmendGasExtraction- 1-0208_text.pdf.
151. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 601.602 (West 2010). See Huntley & Huntley, Inc.
v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 865-69 (Pa. 2009) (holding zoning
ordinances preempted to the extent that they either "contain provisions which impose
conditions, requirements or limitations on the same features of oil and gas well operations
"regulated by" the Act, or "accomplish the same purposes as set forth in" the Act.).
Borough's zoning restriction of "extraction of minerals" to certain residential districts
was permissible and not preempted, but the municipality too narrowly interpreted the
zoning ordinance definition of "extraction of minerals" to exclude oil and gas drilling and
extraction from approved conditional uses.
Huntley & Huntley, Inc. involved
conventional natural gas drilling and not Marcellus Shale gas pioduction. See Reeder,
supra note 6, at 1015-20; John M. Smith, The Prodigal Son Returns: Oil and Gas
Drillers Return to Pennsylvaniawith a Vengeance are MunicipalitiesPrepared?49 DUQ.
L. REv. 1, 30-33 (2011) (discussing municipal zoning rights in Pennsylvania and
regulatory takings in context of Marcellus shale drilling). Other states have also enacted
statutes preempting municipal regulation of oil and gas extraction activities to the extent
that they conflict with State regulation. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 230303(2) (McKinney 2010).
152. See Range Res. v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 86, 872 (Pa. 2009) ("the [Oil and Gas]
Act's preemptive scope is not total in the sense that it does not prohibit municipalities
from enacting traditional zoning regulations that identify which uses are permitted in
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As indicated above, facial Lucas challenges alleging a total taking
by ordinances flatly banning shale gas drilling and production would be
problematic if the law is based upon a legislative finding that gas drilling
and production in urban areas present unacceptable health and/or
environmental risks akin to traditional common law nuisances. For well
over a century the Court has reiterated that the State's police power to
protect public health and safety and advance the general public interest is
broad indeed. "Long ago it was recognized that 'all property in this
country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it
shall not be injurious to the community,' and the Takings Clause did not
transform that principle to one that requires compensation whenever the
153
State asserts its power to enforce it."
Banning noxious industrial uses from a highly urbanized city area
would seem to fit within Lucas's "nuisance exception" to its total taking
rule. A municipal ordinance banning shale gas extraction and production
does not appear inconsistent with centuries of common law public
nuisance restrictions on otherwise legal activities that are undertaken in
the wrong place-"a pig in a parlor rather than in the bamyard"-or are
54
otherwise considered "noxious uses."'
Certainly if an urban, suburban, or rural legislative body were
willing to eschew flat prohibitions for more focused ordinances limiting
shale gas to areas away from residential and other populated areas, they
should find judicial review more deferential. For example, in Penneco
Oil Co. v. County of Fayette, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
held that a traditional county zoning ordinance was not preempted by the
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act:

different areas of the locality, even if such regulations preclude oil and gas drilling in
certain zones.").
153. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987)
(citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664-65 (1887)). In Keystone, the Court upheld a
Pennsylvania law much like the one declared a regulatory taking in Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon. For an analysis and discussion of the two statutes and the Court's disparate
treatment of them, see BundledRights, supra note 92, at 26-30. It has been asserted:
Keystone "is arguably the broadest articulation of the traditional nuisance
exception. While denying a takings challenge to certain mining restrictions that
protected against subsidence, the Keystone majority announced that
government action designed to prevent serious harm does not effect a taking,
even where it destroys property value. The Court concluded that regulations
designed to prevent public harms were immune from Fifth Amendment liability
because "no individual has a right to use his property to create a nuisance or
otherwise harm others."
Blumm & Ritchie, supranote 136, at 331 (citing, Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-92).
154. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("A nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard.").
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[W]hile there may be some overlap between the goals of Fayette
County's Zoning Ordinance and the purposes set forth in the Act, the
most salient objectives underlying restrictions on oil and gas drilling
in certain zoning districts appears in Fayette County to be those
pertaining to preserving the character of residential neighborhoods, as
well as each zoning district, and encouraging beneficial and
compatible land uses. As such, the limited provisions of the Zoning
Ordinance governing oil and gas wells in Fayette County do not
accomplish the same purposes as set forth in Section 102 of the Act,
58 P.S. § 601.102 . .. traditional purposes of zoning are distinct from
the purposes set forth in the Act ... the provisions of the Zoning
Ordinance do not reflect an attempt by Fayette County to enact a
comprehensive regulatory scheme relative to the oil and gas
development within the county but instead reflect traditional zoning
regulations that identify which uses are permitted in different areas of
the locality. The Zoning Ordinance, on its face, is clearly a zoning
ordinance of general applicability... .s
As the Supreme Court of the United States has observed, "many
enterprises cause undesirable externalities ... [fjactories, for example,
may cause pollution, so a city may seek to reduce the cost of that
externality by restricting factories to areas far from residential
neighborhoods."1 56 For example, in Texas, a state closely associated for
more than a century with large-scale oil and natural gas production,
mineral extractive industries have long been subject to state and local
government regulations and land use restrictions.'5 7 In particular, local
well spacing, zoning restrictions, and other provisions designed to
protect the safety and welfare of the general public have consistently
been upheld as a valid exercise of state and local government police
powers.
Thus, there is little doubt that a landowner or mineral estate lessee
should have actual or constructive knowledge that drilling wells and
producing oil and gas within populated communities likely entails
compliance with strict regulatory requirements. Or, perhaps more
importantly, even if such local laws are not on the books at the time the
155.

Penneco Oil Co, v. County of Fayette, 4 A.3d 722, 732-33 (Pa. Commw. Ct.

2010). Two suits have been filed in New York trial courts seeking to enjoin, on
preemption grounds, local zoning regulations that purport to prohibit oil and gas drilling.
See Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. City of Dryden, No.
, (Sup. Ct. N.Y., Tompkins
County, NY, filed September

16,

2011).

The complaint is available

http://drydensec.org/sites/default/files/AnschutzComplaint.pdf

at

See also Cooperstown

Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, No. _, (Sup. Ct. N.Y., Ostego County, NY,
September 15, 2011). The complaint is available at http://media.syracuse.com/news/
other/Middlefield%20Complainto20-091511 .pdf.
156. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 446-47 (2002).

157.

Timothy Rile, supra note 148, at 396-97.
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mineral interest ripened, there still is a reasonable and foreseeable
expectation that such regulations could be promulgated in the future.
However, it is possible that an "as applied" takings challenge to a
local land use ordinance might, in limited circumstances, have some
chance of success. The shale gas owner in such a case might allege that
it could not tap shale gas because the ordinance's prohibition rendered
the property without any economic value. But, in highly developed
urban areas there are few "right places" to position shale gas wells with
attendant intense activities including trucking, use and storage of huge
amounts of water and chemicals, and potential operational risks such as
explosions and toxic air emissions. Certainly shale gas extraction could
be excluded from all residential areas as well as most commercial areas.
Moreover, the very recent emergence of the ability to cost-effectively
extract gas and the speculative nature of those plans to drill wells in
urban areas likely will have to surmount both the Lucas nuisance
exception and the Penn Central"distinct investment-backed expectation"
analysis.
Drilling and production of shale gas might be possible in a few
highly industrialized areas of a city if the risks could be minimized to a
level generally thought acceptable for such areas. Even in such
circumstances, the gas owner's takings claim would not be viable if the
natural gas production activities could be shown to constitute a common
law public or private nuisance-based upon "restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon
land ownership."' 58 However, as Justice Scalia put it in Lucas:
A law or decree with such an effect must ... do no more than
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts-by
adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the
State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public
generally. . ..
In sum, the Lucas total taking rule applies only "when ... a
regulation that declares 'off-limits' all economically productive or
beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background

158.

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). The Lucas "total

taking inquiry" also requires "analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to
public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's
proposed activities . . . and their suitability to the locality in question . . . and the relative

ease with which the alleged harm could be avoided through measures taken by the
claimant and the government (or adjacent private land owners) alike. . . ." Id. at 1030-31
(citations omitted).
159. Id. at 1029 (emphasis supplied).
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principles would dictate. .. .' 60 It is probable that even a flat legislative
ban of drilling and gas production in urban areas might withstand a
Lucas total takings attack. That said, it is also important to emphasize
that total bans or other forms of regulation of shale gas extraction and
production might be challenged as takings under the ad hoc Penn
Central analysis.
2.

Buffer Zones Protection of Water Resources

A similar issue in the same vein as land use regulation of shale gas
activities relates to the scope of government power to prohibit shale gas
hydraulic fracturing within a defined geographic "buffer zone" as a
means of protecting public drinking water supplies from contamination
or diminution. Such regulation is being considered in New York State,
and a municipal ordinance in West Virginia banned shale gas HVHF
upstream from a municipal water supply source.16'
In New York, a draft environmental impact statement indicates that
the State's Department of Environmental Conservation ("NYDEC") is
seriously considering the "buffer zone" approach as a means to protect
public drinking water supplies from the potential adverse consequences
of HVHF operations. Areas proposed as off-limits for surface drilling
for shale gas using HVHF methods include:
[T]he watersheds associated with unfiltered water supplied to the
New York City and Syracuse areas pursuant to Filtration Avoidance
Determinations issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), reforestation areas, wildlife management areas, state parks,
and "primary" aquifers as defined by State regulations, and additional
setback and buffer areas. Forest Preserve land in the Adirondacks
and Catskills is already off-limits to natural gas development
pursuant to the New York State Constitution.162

160. Id. at 1030.
161.

See PRDSG-EIS, supra note 117, at 2.

162.

See MORGANTOWN, W. VA. Bus. & TAX CODE art. 721 (2011). The Morgantown

ordinance identifies specific potential harms alleged to be a consequence of hydraulic
fracturing and declares the activity to be a public nuisance:
It is hereby found and determined that the horizontal drilling for oil and gas
with fracturing or fracking methods in oil and gas drilling operations are
activities which adversely impact the environment, interfere with the rights of
citizens in the enjoyment of their property, and have the potential for adversely
affecting the health, well being and safety of persons living and working in and
around areas where such horizontal drilling with fracturing or fracking drilling
operations exist. Accordingly, it is found that horizontal drilling of oil and gas
wells with fracturing or fracking in oil and gas well operations if performed
within this municipality or within one mile of the City of Morgantown
constitutes a public nuisance. It is also found and determined that the processes
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The New York buffer zone rule clearly implicates regulatory
takings rules. To the extent that a governmental entity can support a
buffer zone rule with evidence of the potential to contaminate a public
water supply, it stands on firm ground in resisting a regulatory takings
challenge. Such regulation would likely be held to be a valid exercise of
the police power-even if the possessor of shale gas rights cannot exploit
its mineral property diminishing the shale gas interest to zero.
Although use of HVHF to produce shale gas may not rise to the
level of a per se common law public nuisance activity, polluting public
drinking water should qualify as a per se nuisance. 6 3 Generally,
background principles of state nuisance and property law allow an
exercise of the police power to protect important public interests from
activities that may harm them, notwithstanding that limiting or even
prohibiting the potentially harmful activity causes substantial monetary
loss or even an economic wipeout. Lucas makes this point clear when it
suggests two hypotheticals:
[T]he owner of a lake-bed, for example, would not be entitled to
compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a
landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding others'
known as horizontal drilling with fracturing or fracking have an increased level
of potential harm which includes, but may not be limited to, contamination of
ground water and hazards associated with the storage, treatment and
transportation of the water or other liquid after being used in the process of
horizontal drilling with fracturing or fracking. These potential hazards
associated with horizontal drilling with fracturing or fracking may impact the
citizens, drinking water, and property within the City of Morgantown, even
though the horizontal drilling with fracturing or fracking activity may take
place outside the corporate limits of the City.
A civil action was filed in a state trial court by a shale gas drilling company seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief and alleging, inter alia, that the ordinance is preempted
by state oil and gas regulatory law and constitutes a regulatory taking. The complaint
sought compensation for the taking. See Ne. Natural Energy L.L.C. v. City of
Morgantown, CA No. 11 -C-411 (Cir. Ct. of Monongalia County, WV, Aug. 12, 2011).
The complaint is available at
http://marcellusdrilling.com/2011/06/driller-sues-morgantown-wv-over-fracking-banmonongalia-county-considers-suing-the-city-too/. The trial court ruled that the city
ordinance was preempted by the West Virginia Oil and Gas law regulating drilling and
production of those substances. See id. (granting Northeast's Motion for Summary
Judgment and concluding that the City ordinance was invalid because it was preempted
by state legislation regulating oil and gas drilling). The trial Court concluded that the
state legislature intended to give the West Virginia Department of Environmental
Protection exclusive regulatory control of all oil and gas drilling operations within the
state including operations requiring sub-surface fracking of shale gas zones. The opinion
at
available
is
http://www.mitchellwilliamslaw.com/wpcontent/filesflutter/13149889459-2attach3.pdf
163. See, e.g., Machipongo Land and Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 774
(Pa. 2002) ("although mining is not a nuisance per se, pollution of public waterways is.
The key to protecting our water is to prevent pollution from occurring.").
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land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it
is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery
that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault.
"Such regulatory action," Lucas instructs, "may well have the effect
of eliminating the land's only economically productive use, but it does
not proscribe a productive use that was previously permissible under
relevant property and nuisance principles.""'
In essence, the Lucas nuisance exception focused on activities that
harm important public interests. Activities that cause such harm may be
regulated, limited, or banned pursuant to the police power. In Lucas, the
South Carolina Coastal Management Act proscribed construction of a
residential dwelling on land owned in fee simple. The activity of
constructing a single family residence certainly has never been subject to
being enjoined or banned by government under established principles of
state property and nuisance law. However, profit making activities on or
under land that harm neighbors or important public interests have for
centuries been subject to restriction or prohibition under such principles.
Obvious examples of clearly valid nuisance restrictions are those
restricting or banning the keeping of a house of ill-repute, a pigsty, and
land uses that cause excessive noise, air, or water pollution. 166 As Lucas
emphasizes, "[t]he use of these properties for what are now expressly
prohibited purposes was always unlawful, and ... it was open to the
State at any point to make the implication of those background principles
of nuisance and property law explicit.16 7 In the context of buffer zones
that may limit HVHF or other shale gas operations to protect the public
interest in clean streams and potable water, there is no question that
background principles of property and nuisance law allow such
legislative prohibitions.
F.

Public Parkland

Perhaps the most likely scenario for a successful Lucas takings
claim would be where shale gas extraction is prohibited in order to
protect government-owned parkland. Where shale gas ownership has
been severed from a fee simple estate and the surface parkland is owned
by a government entity, the total takings issue would be presented.
Recent West Virginia and Pennsylvania cases involving conventional
vertical gas drilling into privately owned (non-shale) gas reserves from

164. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
165. Id. at 1029-30.
166. For other examples, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
167. Id

§ 8211B, cmt. c.
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168 In each
government-owned surface parkland raised the takings issue.
case however, the State Supreme Court resolved the case on established
oil and gas property law or statutory interpretation grounds rather than
adjudicate the constitutional takings claims.
The prohibition of shale gas extraction from under public parkland
allows a glimpse of the best-case scenario for a successful, albeit not
assured, Lucas total takings claim. The argument for a total taking is at
its zenith when government regulation totally devalues real property to
enhance the aesthetic and/or recreational value of government-owned
public parkland. In Lucas, the Court found affirmative support for:

[A] compensation requirement, [in] the fact that regulations that leave
the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive
options for its use-typically ... by requiring land to be left
substantially in its natural state-carry with them a heightened risk
that private property is being pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.

Lucas emphasized that there are many state and federal statutes that
provide for condemnation of land to impose servitudes or acquire title to
lands and that such laws "suggest the practical equivalence in this setting
170
The Lucas Court concluded
of negative regulation and appropriation.,
that "there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when
the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all

168. See Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Huffman, 705 S.E.2d 806 (W. Va. 2010); Belden
& Blake Corp. v. Dept. of Conservation & Natural Res., 969 A.2d 528 (2009). See also
Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., Nos. 10-1265 and 10-2332, slip op. at 27-28 (3d
Cir. Sept. 20, 2011) ("we are reluctant to construe the Weeks Act in a manner raising
difficult constitutional takings questions absent a clear indication of congressional
intent"). In Minard Run, the Third Circuit avoided the regulatory taking issue. It ruled
that federal laws governing mineral property in-holdings within boundaries of a National
Forest did not authorize the agency administering the forest (the United States Forest
Service) to impose additional environmental regulatory requirements upon natural gas
extraction activities of mineral rights owners.
169. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 (citing Annicelli v. S. Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133, 140-41
(R.I. 1983) (prohibition on construction adjacent to beach justified on twin grounds of
safety and "conservation of open space"); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 193 A.2d 232, 240 (N.J. 1963) (prohibition on filling
marshlands imposed in order to preserve region as water detention basin and create
wildlife refuge)).
The Court also quoted Justice Brennan's
170. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018-19.
observation in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. that "[fjrom the government's point of view,
the benefits flowing to the public from preservation of open space through regulation
may be equally great as from creating a wildlife refuge through formal condemnation or
increasing electricity production through a dam project that floods private property." Id.
(quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., v. City of San Diego 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981)
(dissenting opinion)).
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economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to
leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking."' 7 1
Notwithstanding the admonition in Lucas that close scrutiny be
given to allegations of total takings of all economically beneficial value
of property, its per se takings rules require additional analysis before a
court may conclude compensation is due. The Lucas nuisance exception
presents a serious obstacle for the shale gas developer in such
circumstances. Even when the total takings argument is strongest, it may
be defeated by a showing that regulation of shale gas drilling and related
activities would be consistent with background principles of property and
nuisance law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Three decades ago Justice Brennan referred to the Court's search
for a clear regulatory takings rule as the "lawyer's equivalent of the
physicist's search for the quark."1 72 Today, thirty years later, legal
scholars, lawyers and judges are still perplexed by regulatory takings
issues.
Perplexed or not, regulatory takings questions will most
certainly arise as energy companies seek to tap the underground reserves
of the nation's shale gas basins.
The shale gas boom provides a fascinating context for a debate over
the contours of constitutional protection afforded private property.
Owners, lessors, and production companies will inevitably clash with
homeowners and communities concerned that shale gas development will
lead to environmental degradation and/or boom-bust-cycle economic
decline. The power of government to regulate extraction of the new
energy resource will be debated in Legislatures and litigated in the
courts. "Protection of private property rights" will take on a significantly
different meaning in this context where one powerful group of private
property owners is pitted against another.

171. Id. at 1019.
172. Williamson County Reg'1 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
199 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 650 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The attempt to determine when regulation goes so far that it
becomes, literally or figuratively, a 'taking' has been called the 'lawyer's equivalent of
the physicist's hunt for the quark."')
173. See, e.g., Robert H. Thomas, Mark M. Murakami, Tred R. Eyerly, Of
Woodchucks and Prune Yards: A View of Judicial Takingsfrom the Trenches, 35 VT. L.
REv. 437 (2010) ("Eighty-four years after the Supreme Court acknowledged that an
exercise of governmental authority other than the eminent domain power could be a
taking, it appears the search for what might fit the bill has devolved from 'the lawyer's
equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark' to the riddle of a nursery rhyme.")
(citations omitted).
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Setting aside the difficulty in articulating a generally applicable
regulatory taking rule, it is apparent that the Constitution recognizes the
right, indeed the duty, of government to protect important public interests
as well as private property rights from activities that may cause harm. In
this context, the Supreme Court's recognition of the overarching
importance of common law nuisance principles in resolving regulatory
takings claims is not surprising. As Professor Freyfogel has succinctly
observed:
Far from being a land-use constraint arising out of the public sphere,
nuisance law (that is, the sic utere tuo principle) is the very essence of

what it means to own. It is the rule that gives a landowner the key
entitlement to private property: the right to complain about
interferences with one's use and enjoyment. It is chiefly a source of

property rights, not a limit on them.
Thus, Courts faced with takings claims arising from shale gas extraction
regulation must be mindful not only of the property rights of mineral
owners but of their neighbors and the public as well.
As discussed above, regulatory takings jurisprudence applied in
accord with precedent will resolve most shale gas takings claims. Where
shale gas rights are a strand of the broader bundle of rights inuring in real
property, it will be difficult for one to prevail on a regulatory takings
claim.
When the takings claimant owns only the shale gas and the right to
extract and sell it, a Lucas "total taking" claim would lie. Lucas
recognizes, however, that if the government regulation at issue is based
upon "background principles of nuisance and property law"
independently restricting the shale gas owner's extraction, no
compensable taking occurs. Lucas teaches that this is true even where
application of a regulation has reduced the value of shale gas rights to
zero.
Where the claim is that less than a total taking has occurred by
virtue of a regulation based on land use concerns, rather than using
common law nuisance principles, courts should look to the Penn Central
calculus to resolve the dispute, including an analysis of the reasonable
investment-backed expectations of the takings claimant.

174. Freyfogel, supra note 26, at 98. The maxim, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas" refers to the Latin phrase used by courts to describe the correlative rights of
neighboring property owners and the public. It means simply "use your own property in
such manner as not to injure that of another." The Supreme Court first mentions the term
in the context of a discussion of common law nuisance in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
124-25 (1876).
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Many view shale gas as having the potential to provide an important
bridge to our country's energy future. The promise of jobs and economic
growth attendant shale gas expansion comes at a crucial time as the
nation struggles with myriad problems. The development of this vast
resource must move forward in a manner that protects the natural
environment with appropriate respect for the protection of the private
property rights of all concerned. Only then will the full potential of shale
gas be realized.

